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It is a pleasure to introduce Prasadranjan RayTs monograph 
"Whither Indian Tea?" This study, as many before it, had its genesis 
in a paper submitted for my Fall term course, "Food, Population, and 
Employment." It is suggestive of the quality of work now being done 
by students in Cornell’s program in International Economics and Devel­
opment .
The paper examines the problems of the Indian tea economy against 
the backdrop of a depressed world market for tea. It identifies low 
profitability and minimal investment as the principal constraints to a 
healthy tea industry; but notes that foreign exchange earned by tea 
exports has been further reduced by rapidly rising domestic consumption 
and declining real prices. Mr. Ray concludes that the International 
Tea Agreement, currently being renegotiated, is unlikely to improve the 
situation radically. Rather, he advocates a host of domestic policy 
measures, including fiscal incentives and a smallholder tea project, as 
the main tools for inducing investment and innovation.
Mr. Ray is an officer in the elite Indian Administrative Service 
and has served for more than five years in the "tea country" of Dar­
jeeling and Dooars in West Bengal. He attended Cornell for one year 
in 1980-81 under the Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Fellowship Program. 
Comments and suggestions are welcomed and should be addressed to:
Mr. Prasadranjan Ray, District Magistrate
Murshidabad
P.0. Berhampore
West Bengal PIN 742101
INDIA
Mr. Ray has asked me to note that the views expressed are his and 
do not necessarily reflect the thinking of the Indian government. I
can.think.of.no.tetter.way.to.salute.the work.of.a.superior.student.khan
to suggest that they should.
We are indebted to Lillian Thomas for preparing the graphics and 
typing Mr. Ray's manuscript. .
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Tea has been a commodity of significant commercial interest to 
India from the 1850s onward. Today, it is a major commercial crop in 
a number of less-developed countries (LDCs) including India, and a 
widely consumed beverage all over the world. It is becoming increas­
ingly important as a consumption item in many LDCs. As a major LDC 
agricultural export item, the problems of tea trade due to export price 
instability and declining terms of trade have attracted international 
attention (J^, pp. 22-26; 2_, p. 260; _3, pp. 8-9). Doubts have also been 
expressed about the future of the Indian tea plantation industry (3, 
pp. 73-75; 4, PP* 21-34) in view of declining export earnings, inability 
of the government to induce fresh investments into the tea sector and 
growing misunderstanding between the industry and the government over 
major policy issues such as taxation and export policy.
In the context of these issues, this study makes a review of 
• the Indian tea economy;
•the world tea market;
•the proposed scheme of international action on tea; and
•the domestic policy issues involved with the rejuvenation 
of the Indian tea industry.
The study is, therefore, concerned with policy issues at the level 
of national and international administrators involved with the tea 
industry.
ARE THERE CAUSES FOR CONCERN?
The major adverse features of the Indian tea economy in the post- 
World War II period have been:
• a declining share of the world tea market;
« capital-starvation of the industry;
* an atmosphere of distrust between theindustry and the 
government.
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Over the period 1955-79, the Indian share of the world tea export 
market has declined from above 50 percent to about 25 percent. Indian 
tea exports have stagnated at about 200,000 metric tons (MT) over the 
entire postwar period and, while the nominal value of tea exports has 
more than doubled over this period, the real value has been declining. 
Indian tea exports are being squeezed by rising domestic consumption, 
and high costs of production adversely affect the competitiveness of 
Indian tea vis-a-vis African and Chinese tea exports. The issue has 
become more vital in the context of the rising trade deficit which 
increased from $132 million in March 1971 to $1419 million in March 1979 
(5, p. 89).
Capital investment in the tea industry in India over the last three 
decades has been grossly insufficient. Replantation of old bushes has 
progressed at much below optimal level and capital value of tea estates 
are going down. The low level of tea prices and the heavy burden of 
taxation are disincentives against investments in the tea sector which 
have been less profitable than investments in other industrial sectors 
(6, pp. 36-45).
The climate for investments has also not been very suitable due to 
a communication gap between the tea industry and the government. While 
the tea industry has been pointing out the need for taxation relief, 
many state governments have further increased taxation rates. There has 
been a tendency for the industry to blame the government for all its 
ills and for the government to blame the industry for not plowing back 
enough of its profits (7_, pp. 10-23, 38-44).
In the international market, the major concerns have been about 
export price fluctuations and declining terms of trade.
While most studies find tea to be a relatively stable commodity 
compared to most primary agricultural commodities, more recent data sug­
gest that the degree of instability in tea export values and prices 
increased noticeably in the 1970s. A high degree of export instability 
adversely affects investment planning and may lead to instability of 
national income, employment and government revenue (_8, pp. 18-20; 9_, 
p. 11; 10, pp. 5-6).
With the exception of tea booms in 1953-54 and 1975-78, the terms 
of trade for tea have been secularly declining throughout the postwar 
period. David Blandford's analysis (8_, pp. 5-18) showed that over the 
period 1950-76 the nominal value of tea exports increased by 1.3 percent 
per annum, the real value declined by 0.9 percent per annum and the real 
unit value declined by 3.1 percent per annum. In terms of growth of 
real unit value, tea ranked 12 among the 13 major LDC agricultural export 
commodities compared by Blandford.
IMPORTANCE OF THE TEA SECTOR FOR INDIA
The tea sector in India is important from the point of view of: 
•contribution to the gross national product (GNP);
•contribution to export earnings;
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• contribution to government revenues; 
•contribution to employment; and 
•support to other sectors. 
Contribution to GNP
The tea sector is a significant contributor to the national income 
of India. The gross value of tea produced in India was above Rs£' 1100 
million in 1950-51 and this increased to above Rs 8000 million by 1978-79. 
Though the share of the tea sector in the national income declined from 
1.4 percent in 1950-51 to 0.9 percent in 1978-79, contribution from the 
tea sector remained significant throughout. The output of the tea sector 
and the GNP in billions of rupees (undeflated) were as follows (11):
1950-51 1960-61 1978-79
Output Value of Tea 1 2 8
Gross National Product 80 150 900
The contribution to the value added is about 75 percent from plantations 
and 25 percent from manufacturing (12, p. 8).
Contribution of Export Earnings
The export earnings from Indian tea increased from about Rs 800 mil­
lion in 1950-51 to above Rs 3000 million in 1978-79. While the contribu­
tion of tea to the export sector has declined from about 20 percent in 
the early 1950s to below 10 percent by the late 1970s, tea still remains 
a very important export commodity. The export performance of Indian tea 
over the last three decades is tabluated below in millions of rupees (1 1 ).
1951 1955 1961 1971 1981
Tea Export Earnings 900 1,500 1 ,200 1,600 3,000
Total Export Earnings 7,000 6,000 6,500 15,000 57,000
Percentage Share of 
Tea 13 25 19 10 6
The tea sector has also been a major source of government revenues. 
The direct government revenues from tea in the shape of tea cess, excise 
duty and export duty amounted to about Rs 150 million in 1951 and 
increased to above Rs 1600 million by 1978. Total government revenue 
from the tea sector has been estimated at about double the direct tax 
revenues (13, p. 24) by a United States Agency for International Devel­
opment (USAID)-sponsoredstudy. The directtaxcontributions of the tea
1/ A rupee, the Indian unit of currency, was equal to 20 cents until 
1967, and since has floated between 12 and 14.5 cents.
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sector in millions of rupees have been (14):
1951 1961 1971 1978
Direct Tax Revenues from Tea 150 200 400 1,600
Total Revenues of Union of India 3,600 7,300 24,500 70,500
Contribution to Employment
The tea plantation and manufacturing industry directly employed above 
one million workers in the early 1950s. This has dropped now to about 
800,000 during the late 1970s but the total (direct and indirect) employ­
ment provided by tea has been estimated at 1.8 million for 1976 (15, p. 115) 
a very significant proportion of the total employment in the private organized 
sector.2/ Direct employment in millions provided by the tea sector has varied 
as follows (11: 14):
1951
Direct Employment in Tea Sector 1.02
Total Employment in Private, Organized Sector 4.30
Growth Linkages
Apart from its direct importance to the national economy, the tea indus­
try in India provided support to the plywood industry in the Eastern India 
since plywood chests are almost exclusively used as packaging material. The 
industry also provided a major market for the fertilizer industry, long 
before domestic fertilizer demand was given a boost by the "Green Revolu­
tion." As the tea estates were located in interior forested regions, estab­
lishment of the industry led to opening of rail and road links which were 
important for development of these backward regions. The tea industry also 
contributed very significantly to provision of housing, medical and educa­
tional facilities in the interior.
Changes Over Time
Over the last three decades, the importance of the tea sector to India 
in relative terms has gradually declined. While the value of the tea output, 
export earnings and direct revenues have increased, the actual employment 
generated in tea has declined over 1950-80 (Figure 1). In real terms, the 
revenues from the tea sector have increased over this period while export 
earnings have stagnated (Figure 2). Taking into account the overall impact 
of the tea sector on all aspects of the economy, however, it still counts 
as one of the most important economic sectors in India and its development 
prospects remain intimately linked with development prospects of the nation.
2/ This refers to the private sector establishments employing 25 or 
more people.
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FIGURE 1. INDIA: GROSS VALUE OF OUTPUT, EXPORT EARNINGS, DIRECT
TAX REVENUE AND DIRECT EMPLOYMENT FROM TEA, 1950-80.
Source: APPENDIX TABLE I & TABLE V.
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. INDIA: GROSS VALUE OF OUTPUT, EXPORT EARNINGS AND DIRECT 
TAX REVENUE FROM TEA (IN REAL TERMS)
REAL DIRECT TAX REVENUE
APPENDIX TABLE I.
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TEA AS A CASH CROP 
Origins and Ecology of Tea
The origins of tea (Camellia Sinensis) in the region comprising 
South-East China, Upper Indochina, Upper Burma and Assam seem fairly 
well established now. Tea was clearly first domesticated in China and, 
while early uses were probably medicinal, it has a recorded history of 
2000-3000 years as a beverage (16, pp. 599-600; 17, pp. 117-119).
Two subspecies— China tea and Assam tea— are known. The China tree 
is small, slow-growing, with small erect leaves and singly-borne flowers, 
resistant to cold but a low yielder. Assam tea is taller, quick-growing, 
with large drooping leaves and two to four flowers in a cluster and a 
high yielder, suited to tropical conditions. Numerous hybrids and 
mutants are used in commercial tea cultivation today (14, pp. 600-601).
Tea is suited for subtropical, rather than tropical ecology. Tea 
grows best in cool, equable climate with mean temperatures in the range 
of 55-85°F. and a rainfall of at least 45 inches annually. In the tropics 
it grows well on elevations of 4000-6000 feet. China teas can tolerate 
cooler temperatures but very cold weather prevents flowering in winter.
Tea also requires well-drained, deep, permeable and acidic soils. While 
the major tea regions spread from 30°N to 10°S latitude, tea is today 
grown even up to 50°N latitude in USSR and down to 30°S latitude in 
Mozambique and South Africa (Figure 3) (16, pp. 601-606; 18, pp. 8-13).
Spread of Tea Consumption
From China, tea is believed to have been first introduced to Japan 
in the eighth century and, by the 16th century, when Europeans arrived 
upon the scene, Chinese and Japanese tea drinking ceremonies were well- 
established. The Portuguese set up a trading post at Macao in 1557 and 
were the first European nation to be exposed to tea. The Dutch and 
British East India companies established trading posts in South China 
and Japan and engaged In the tea trade. While tea consumption did not 
become very popular in continental Europe, it made quite an impact in 
Britain. The first public tea sale was held at London in 1657 and Brit­
ish East India Company started importing China tea on a regular basis 
.. from .1669. British coffee houses started selling tea for public consump­
tion from 1704. Tea consumption in Britain shot up from about 150,000 
pounds in 1701 to 24 million pounds in 1801, and reached 260 million 
pounds by 1901 (19, pp. 284-285). During the 19th century, tea also 
became popular in the "white" dominions— Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Ireland— though the "Boston Tea Party" spoiled tea's 
chances in the United States. Tea drinking had already become popular 
inCzaristRussiathroughthe"CaravanTrade"fromChinaand by 1913 
Russians were major tea drinkers. Tea drinking never became very popu- 
lar in the rest of Europe (except Netherlands). In the present century, 
tea drinking gradually caught on in producing countries (notably India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon). Tea was introduced to the Middle-East and North 
Africa by the late 1930s and became very popular in the postwar period. 
Recent consumption trends show that tea consumption is rising rapidly 
in the less-developed countries (LDCs) while consumption is stagnating 
or declining in the developed countries (DCs).
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Spread of Tea Production
The rising popularity of the drink and the political uncertainties 
of the China trade induced the British and Dutch East India Companies 
to introduce commercial tea plantations to their Asian colonies. Though 
the Dutch made the first attempt to introduce tea plantations to Java 
in 1690, the British first successfully introduced commercial tea culti­
vation to North-East India in the 1830s. Following successful early 
experiments, tea plantations in India expanded fast from the 1850s. Fol­
lowing the coffee rust disease (Hemileia vastatrix) outbreak in the Cey­
lonese coffee plantations, tea plantations were started in Ceylon in 
1867. The Dutch East Indies also had successful commercial tea planta­
tions by 1878. India displaced China as the top tea exporter by 1888 
and, by the 1930s, India, Ceylon and Dutch East Indies were the leading 
tea exporters.
Tea plantations were started in Nyasaland in 1891 and in Kenya- 
Uganda-Tanganyika between 1909 and 1925 but did not become economically 
important for Africa before the 1950s. In the postwar period, aided by 
suitable climate, available land and cheap labor, tea production expanded 
enormously in Kenya and significantly in Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania and 
Zaire. African tea exports are expanding very fast now.
Tea production also expanded greatly in the trans-Caucasian region 
of USSR (notably Georgia and Azerbaijan), Turkey and Iran in the post- 
1950 period. By 1979, the region produced above 200,000 MT of tea, 
though largely for domestic consumption.
Tea plantations were started in South Brazil and Northern Argentina 
in the 1950s and in Papua-New Guinea in the 1960s. Latin American growth 
appears to have slowed down now and these relatively "new" regions have 
yet to make an impact on the world trade scenario.
Current Status of Tea as a Cash Crop
Today, tea is cultivated under diverse physical conditions in 32 
countries around the world (Figure 3). It is consumed in significant 
quantities in 97 countries and is a major article of trade. Over the 
period 1970-75, average world exports of tea amounted to 781,000 MT and 
they were worth $795 million. In terms of value, tea ranked as the 
seventh most important agricultural commodity in world trade and the 
sixth most important agricultural export commodity from the LDCs-— fol­
lowing coffee, sugar, cotton, rubber and cocoa (8_, p. 2).
HISTORY OF THE TEA INDUSTRY IN INDIA 
A Tentative Start,.1778-1840.................... .........................
The rise of the tea industry in India was intimately connected with 
British colonial and commercial interests. In 1778, Sir Joseph Banks 
was entrusted with making recommendations for growing new crops in India
-lo­
an d he advocated tea cultivation in North-East India. Missions were 
sent to China by the East India Company for obtaining detailed infor­
mation on cultivation and manufacture of tea and the issue gained urgency 
by 1828 when British commercial relations with China became uncertain.
In the meantime, two young officers, Bruce and Charlton, separately 
discovered "wild" Assam tea. A Tea Committee was set up in 1834 and 
experimental plantations were tried out in Assam, sub-Himalayan regions, 
and South India with China and native Assam tea seeds. While experi­
ments elsewhere were less than successful, the plantation at Suddiya 
(Assam) succeeded and the first batch of tea sent to England fetched 
high prices in the London auctions in 1839 (20, pp. 33-53).
Steady Growth, 1840-1947
The success in the early auctions encouraged British entrepreneurs 
at London and Calcutta and, in 1839, Assam Company was set up in London 
which took over all the East India Company plantations. Money was raised 
in London for investments and the Assam plantations started expanding. 
After a troubled phase in 1846-47, the company made profits in 1848 and 
made steady progress since 1850. From 1851 other companies and indivi­
duals also started plantations in Assam and 51 tea estates were set up 
by 1859. The production of black tea increased from 5,000 pounds in 
1839 to 330,000 pounds in 1865 (20, pp. 61-75).
Experimental tea plantations were started in the North-West Hima­
layas in the Kumaon and Carhwal ranges in 1840-41. Though some estates 
did start there, the climate and soil were not found to be very good 
for tea. Other experiments yielded happier results and tea was success­
fully introduced to Chittagong (Bangladesh) in 1843, to Darjeeling (West 
Bengal) in 1852, to Cachar (South Assam) in 1855, to Sylhet (Bangladesh) 
in 1856 and to Terai (submontane West Bengal) in 1860. Following the 
ravage of the coffee plantations of South India by the coffee trust, tea 
was introduced to the hill regions of the Nilgiris, Kannan Devan hills, 
Wynaad and Annamalai hills in the present state of Tamilnadu, Kerala and 
Karnataka from 1862. Tea soon became the premier plantation crop of 
South India displacing coffee and rubber (20, pp. 76-95, 156-169).
The early plantations faced acute problems of poor communication, 
ill health,and shortage of labor. Unhealthy speculation in the tea 
market also raised its head by the 1870s. However, the planters over­
came these difficulties and made steady progress till the turn of the 
century. Indian tea production expanded from 366,000 pounds in 1853 to 
reach 6.4 million pounds by 1867 and a staggering 197 million pounds by 
1900. In the meantime, during the 1880s, Indian tea and Ceylon tea 
started displacing China tea from the British market and, by 1900, China 
had only a tenth of the British market (20, pp. 109-144).
The industry made steady progress since the turn of the century, 
though the specter of overproduction was haunting the industry, the pro­
duction having reached 307 million pounds by 1913. The First World War, 
however, raised demands for tea and brought prosperity to the industry. 
The high prices of the immediate postwar years brought a wave of new 
plantings and this, coupled with similar expansions in Ceylon and Dutch
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East Indies, brought a serious slump from 1926. Voluntary crop restric­
tions were tried from 1929 and international regulation from 1933. Prices 
improved and the Second World War brought another spurt in demand and 
bailed the industry out of trouble (20, pp. 170-211),
Post-Independence Problems, 1947 On
The immediate postwar period saw Indian independence in 1947. 
Independence brought to the fore the forces of economic nationalism.
While the major expansion of the tea industry had taken place with the 
help of British capital, Indians started establishing proprietary and 
company tea estates from the late 19th century. By 1947, however, the 
British companies were still dominant in the tea sector. Instead of 
seeking nationalization of tea estates, the Indian government has sought 
to control the tea companies through the Tea Board (set up in 1954), to 
Indianize them by gradual restrictions on employment of expatriates in 
superior positions and to "rupeeize" the sterling companies through mone­
tary restrictions. Despite a progressive Indianization, however, the role 
of foreign capital is still significant. The liaison between the industry 
and the government also remains far from ideal (20, pp. 216-239).
The major problem facing the government is the disinvestment of the 
tea estates over the last three decades, which has caused a decline in the 
general health of the industry. Inflow of foreign capital ceased in the 
1950s and domestic capital mobilization and plow-back have been slow and 
much below the rate required even to preserve the capital value of the 
estates. The result has been a slow decline, an outcry from the industry 
protesting government neglect, and sporadic attempts to provide incentives 
for investment which, however, have not produced the desired results.
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CHAPTER XX. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIAN TEA ECONOMY
PRODUCTION OF TEA 
Production Growth Over Time
Once the commercial success of Indian tea plantations was estab­
lished in the 1850s, Indian tea plantations enjoyed sustained growth 
and survived two periods of uncertainty in the 1870s and 1930s. The 
sustained growth of Indian tea over the long period has certainly been 
striking. Over the past century, acreage and production have increased
as follows (_1, p. 129; 2^  pp. 1-3).
1870 1900 1930 1970
Land Under Tea (1000 ha.) 84 212 325 357
Production of Tea (1000 MT) 20 90 177 435
A review of the current production trends reveals that, till 1930,
the expansion was largely extensive, but a large-scale intensive devel­
opment with yield maximization has taken place over the period 1930-79 . 
The sustained yield increase over the last 50 years has been attributed 
to 03, pp. 8-1 1 ):
•scientific agronomic practices;
' ©pest and disease control;
•spread of irrigation;
•replanting with better quality planting material; and 
•effective pruning and harvesting techniques.
The current (1979) production level is 550,000 MT from a planted 
area of 366,000 hectares, which makes India the biggest producer of tea 
in the world. Indian tea yields over the period 1977-79 have been con­
sistently above 1500 kilograms per hectare. This compares very favorably 
with Japanese yields around 1800 kilograms per hectare, which are the 
highest in the world.
Regional Variations in Production
Tea production in India is scattered around diverse geographical 
regions (Figure 4). The major producing regions are North-East India
-14-
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FIGURE 4. INDIA: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF TEA PLANTATIONS
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and South India. North-East Indian production is concentrated in the 
states of Assam and West Bengal— the major tea districts being the Assam 
Valley and the Surma Valley (Cachar) in Assam, and the mountainous Dar­
jeeling district with the submontane Terai and Dooars in West Bengal.
In the south, production is confined to the states of Tamilnadu and 
Kerala. South Indian tea areas are near the equator and, consequently, 
tea is cultivated at altitudes of 2000-6000 feet in the Nilgiri, Kannan- 
Devan and Annamalai mountain ranges. Some tea is also grown in North- 
West India in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh^ and an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to introduce tea cultivation to Bihar (3_, 
p. 95), but these regions are not of commercial importance. An attempt 
has been made recently to introduce tea plantations to nontraditional 
areas in North-East India. More than 50,000 hectares have been found 
suitable for tea cultivation in Tripura, Manipur, Sikkim, Mizoram and 
Nagaland but, despite state support, little headway has been made in 
the matter (_4, p. 593).
The regional patterns display considerable variations in producti­
vity (Table 1). South Indian plantations showed the highest producti­
vity, followed by Assam, Dooars and Terai while Darjeeling yields were 
very low by comparison. The nontraditional areas are not yet important 
in terms of production or yield.
Organization of Production
Production in India has been largely concentrated in large estates 
rather than in smallholdings. The number of production units has ..." 
increased considerably over the last three decades (Appendix Table II) 
to reach 13,000 by 1979 as against 6,500 in 1950, The number of tea 
estates (above five hectares in size) has, however, remained steady at 
about 1800 over this period, and the expansion has been due to growth 
of smallholders as a result of land reforms and as part of the Govern­
ment program to rehabilitate repatriated tea estate laborers from Sri 
Lanka. By 1977, out of 13,166 production units in India, 11,507 units 
belonged to smallholders but they operated only 9,093 hectares between 
them. Smallholders contributed an insignificant amount to the produc­
tion, through the exact amount could not be assessed in recent years 
since their production was channelled through cooperative factories, 
"bought-leaf" factories and hand-processing units. Their contribution 
to production was assessed at less than 0.01 percent in 1961 (5^, pp. 
7-10).
Role of Smallholders
Despite the almost complete neglect of the smallholder sector in 
the tea production strategy at the national level, organization of small­
holders into cooperatives has been receiving increasing attention in 
recent years, particularly in South India where most of them are located. 
Most of the smallholders cultivate tea using family labor, use little 
fertilizer or chemical weedicide/pesticide and sell their green leaves 
at low prices to "bought-leaf" factories. There are about 80 such fac­
tories in South India, which generally advance money to the producers,
-17-
TABLE 1. INDIA: PRODUCTION OF TEA ACCORDING TO
REGIONS, 1975-77 (AVERAGE)
Planted Area Production Yield
(1000 ha.) (1000 MT) (kg./ha.)
North India 290.5 403.6 1389
Assam Valley 158.4 245.9 1552
Cachar 31.1 31.0 994
Darjeeling 18.0 1 1 . 2 622
Terai/Dooars 70.9 109.1 1539
Others* 1 2 . 1 6.4 530
South India 74.1 115.6 1560
Tamilnadu 36.0 64.6 1792
Kerala 36.3 47.7 1314
Others** 1 . 8 3.3 1839
TOTAL ALL INDIA 364.6 519.2 1424
* Includes Tripura, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh.
** Includes Karnataka.
Source: Tea Board of India, Tea Statistics, 1977-78, pp. 5-6,
10-11, 14-15.
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purchase their green leaves at a low price and, after processing tea of 
indifferent quality through old processing equipment, sell it to the 
domestic market at a low price 05, pp. 71-72).
Following the recommendation of the Plantation Enquiry Commission 
(1956), the first cooperative tea factory was set up in the Nilgiris in 
1958. By 1978, there were 11 cooperative factories in the Nilgiris (Tamil— 
nadu) and four elsewhere. Though cooperative organization of smallholders 
elsewhere has been far from a success, the movement has acquired some 
momentum in the Nilgiris where, by 1978, 5,265 growers with 4,691 hec­
tares have been brought into their fold. The prices paid out by the 
cooperatives to the growers have increased considerably over the last 
few years. Improved services including supply of fertilizers, pesti­
cides and planting materials, and warehousing and marketing are being 
provided by the cooperatives and growers are gradually being weaned from 
the control of the bought-leaf factories.
The quantity and value of green tea leaves bought by the coopera­
tive factories from smallholders are detailed below (7^  p. 79):
Quantity Value
Price Paid to 
Growers
1973-74
(million kg.) 
9.3
(million Rs) 
7.3
(Rs/kg.)
0.8
1974-75 1 2 . 1 16.0 1.3
1975-76 14.4 19.6 1.4
1976-77 16.7 34.7 2 . 1
1977-78 23.0 52.5 2.3
Over 1975-78, due to the buoyant tea market, all but one of the coop­
eratives were making profits and their volume of business was steadily 
expanding. The Nilgiri cooperatives had a paid-up capital of Rs 10.4 
million by 1978 (of which Rs 1.9 million was the state share) and were 
being cited as a success story. The turnover of the cooperative facto­
ries in Tamilnadu has increased over the last decade (7_, p. 79) as
follows:
Quantity Quantity Sale Sale
Processed Sold Price Proceeds
(mil. kg.) (mil. kg.) (Rs/kg.) (mil. Rs)
1967-68 1.9 1 . 6 5.3 8.5
1969-70 3.0 2.9 4.6 13.2
1973-74 3.1 2.5 5.1 12.7
1977-78 5.9 5.6 1 2 . 1 72.4
The state government is now envisaging a project for smallholders
covering 4,500 acres to be served by 5 new cooperative factories at an
investment of Rs 100 million. The project will rehabilitate 5000 repa­
triated estate laborers from Sri Lanka. Despite the widely acclaimed 
success of the cooperative tea venture, however, its impact has been 
localized and far from sustained as yet. A national policy toward small­
holders is yet to emerge (6 ,^ pp. 47-71; 7_* p. 79).
-19-
Size-Distribution of Estates
While estates overwhelmingly dominate production of tea, the 
estates are far from homogeneous in size. Estates have been classi­
fied as small and marginal (below 100 hectares), medium-sized (100- 
200 hectares) and big (above 200 hectares) (_8, pp. 32-34). The size- 
class distribution of estates (Table 2) indicates a wide dispersal, 
though the big estates dominate— having 80 percent of the total planted 
area under tea— and the average size of an estate is 212 hectares (9_, 
p. 115).
The concentration of estates is more important in North India than
in South India— the Hirschmann index of concentration (I = E P . , wherex ’
P. is the percentage contribution of the ith item) for tea areas for the 
year 1969 being 59.7 for North India and 51.1 for South India. Avail­
able evidence also suggests that concentration is tending to increase 
over time 08, p. 25).
Size-Productivity Relation of Estates
Available data also suggest (Appendix Table III) that the larger 
estates enjoy the benefits of economies of scale and they are more pro­
ductive. This implies that concentration of tea production is even 
higher than concentration of tea area, and the big estates enjoy a dis­
proportionately large share of the production (Figure 5) .
Organization of Estate Production
While production is normally regarded as concentrated in large 
estates, the Indian tea estates are far from homogeneous in organiza­
tional structure. From the point of view of ownership, the estates are 
dichotomized into those controlled by "Sterling Companies" incorporated 
in the United Kingdom and those controlled by "Rupee Companies" incor­
porated in India. The Rupee Companies, structurally, are divided into 
Public Limited Companies and Private Limited Companies. Apart from 
these, there are proprietary estates, not organized as companies at all.
About 22 percent of the estates were under sterling company manage­
ment as against 38 percent under rupee company management, and 40 percent 
were proprietary estates in 1970. However, sterling company estates 
were much bigger, controlling 43 percent of.the planted area, and pro­
prietary estates much smaller with only 15 percent of the planted area. 
The size-distribution of estates according to management class in 1970 
was (6_, p . 42):
2
AverageSize
Humber Hectarajge- in— Hectares
Sterling Companies 
Rupee Companies (Public) 
Rupee Companies (Private) 
Proprietary Estates
349
432
179
621
142,238
114,612
27,168
48,825
408
265
152
79
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FIGURE5 . INDIA:DISTRIBUTIONOFNUMBER,TEAAREAAND 
TEA PRODUCTION OF ESTATES BY SIZE, 1975
NUMBER AREA PRODUCTION
OF ESTATES UNDER TEA OF TEA
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In view of the size-productivity correlation, the control of ster­
ling companies over tea production would be considerably more than the 
control over planted area. The pattern of control does not vary much 
regionally— in 1970, 41 percent of North Indian hectarage and 50 percent 
of South Indian hectarage were owned by sterling companies.
The sterling companies started with British capital and enterprise, 
enjoyed state patronage in various forms, were better organized,, and had 
a better access to the British market. More than most other industries, 
tea was dominated by Sterling capital even in the 1950s. The government 
was concerned about progressive "Indianization" and, while resisting 
nationalization, has sought to decrease foreign control. Over the years, 
Indian control over the tea crop has increased (^8, p.29):
1937 1951 1954 1969
Percentage of Tea Crop
Under Indian Control 15,9 23.7 30.0 41.6
Nevertheless, role of foreign capital still remained considerable 
in the 1970s and this was of concern to the central government in view 
of the implied dependence, lack of control^ and heavy rate of repatriation 
of profits with little fresh inflow (10, pp. 305-320). Over 1956-61, the 
plantation sector (largely tea) repatriated and distributed 96 percent of 
net profits, retaining only 4 percent (10, p. 309). Also, over 1970-74, 
the net capital outflow from the plantation sector was, on an average,
33.4 million rupees per year (11, p. 104). The recent instrument adopted 
by the Indian government is the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA),
1974. Under FERA, directions have been issued to foreign companies to 
convert themselves into rupees companies and to dilute foreign holding of 
equity shares. As tea belonged to the export-oriented "core" sector, 
sterling tea companies were directed to reduce foreign holdings only to 
74 percent by the end of 1977. However, by mid-1978, only 36 of the 114 
sterling companies were " rupee ized’1 and 20 more were in the process.
More time has been granted and the Reserve Bank of India has banned profit 
repatriation to coerce the rest, but the future is still unclear. Some 
sterling companies want to sell out to new rupee companies and this could 
adversely affect the level of management and productivity (1 2 , p. 618; 13, 
p. 1968).
The Role of the Managing Agency System
The entry of British capital into the tea plantation industry brought 
with it the rise of the managing agency system. A London-based company 
entered into an agreement. with a Calcutta-based agency house to supervise 
the functioning of the estates, provide consultancy, and arrange supplies 
and marketing in a centralized manner in return for profit-sharing and 
representation on the board of the "home" country. Centralization of 
services brought an economy of scale and agency houses, almost invariably 
sterling companies themselves, prospered. Some of the agency houses also 
financed some tea companies and others took over estates of their own. By 
1956, 13 Calcutta-based agency houses controlled 75 percent of North Indian 
tea production (14, p. 23). By 1966, concentration was reduced but they 
still controlled over 60 percent of the crop (Table 3). Such concentration
-23-
TABLE 3. NORTH INDIA: CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION OF
TEA BY LEADING AGENCY HOUSES, 1966
Agency House
Number of 
Gardens Production
Percentage 
Production of 
North India
(metric tons)
Duncan Brothers &
Co. Ltd.
Macneill & Barry 
Ltd.
Williamson Magor & 
Co. Ltd.
Balmer Lawrie &
Co. Ltd.
James Warren &
Co. Ltd.
James Finlay &
Co. Ltd.
Shaw Wallace &
Co. Ltd.
Octavius Steel 
& Co. Ltd.
Jardine Henderson 
& Co. Ltd.
Gillanders Arbuthnot
...&.Co..Lid-,......
Davenport & Co. (P) 
Ltd.
Andrew Yule & Co. 
Ltd.
45 22,589 8.0
40 19,816 7.0
46 18,671 6.6
33 17,733 6.3
34 16,028 5.7
24 15,749 5.6
26 13,160 4.7
37 13,157 4 .7
21 11,229 4,0
O 1.................. .1 fl.O QO .................. O -OZ x J * U
- 7,584 2.7
_ 5,563 2.0
McLeod & Co. Ltd. 5,430  1 .9
Source: H. Roy, Tea Price Stabilisation— The Indian Case, 1968,
p. 150A.
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of production, taken in conjunction with control over many other indus­
trial sectors, concerned the government and led them to impose controls 
on agency houses through the Companies Act, 1956. Several commissions 
also expressed concern over the monopolistic power of such houses. Gradu­
ally, most of the agency houses have become Indianized through inter­
mingling of commercial interests, but concentration on production of 
tea remains (15, pp. 165-167; 10, pp. 5-8; 16, pp. 62-63).
Role of the Producers1 Associations
The early problems faced by planters, particularly in recruitment 
of labor, pointed out the need for the tea companies to associate and 
cooperate. The sterling companies took the lead in this and established 
the Indian Tea Association, London in 1879 and the Indian Tea Associa­
tion, Calcutta in 1881. Organically, London and Calcutta associations 
kept separate, though membership was mostly common. The ITA, Calcutta 
was and still remains the premier association of tea companies in North 
India. The ITA set up branches in Assam, Surma Valley, Darjeeling,
Terai and Dooars and worked in close cooperation with its member estates.
Since the ITA was set up exclusively by British planters, the Indian 
proprietory estates and tea companies set up their own associations begin­
ning with the Indian Tea Planters1 Association in 1919. Thereafter, vari­
ous associations representing regional interests in Terai, Tripura, Assam 
Valley, Cachar, Kangra Valley and Dehradun were established. In the 
south, similar regional interest groups were formed first, and common 
interest led them to form a central body— the United Planters1 Association 
of South India (UPASI) in 1893.
Though ultimately all associations including ITA and UPASI were 
opened to Indian companies, the multiplicity of associations continued 
and, by 1980, there were 27 tea associations in the country (Appendix 
Table IV). To set up a common forum, however, the Consultative Committee 
of Plantation Associations (CCPA) was formed in 1956. The CCPA has since 
organized several seminars on the tea industry and focused national 
attention on the problems (17, pp. 142-144; 1_, pp. 513-546).
The associations were primarily set up to regulate labor conditions 
and labor relations in the industry. They also provided technical advice 
to members, and medical services and food supplies were channeled 
through them. More Important, practically all the research and develop­
ment work was done by them. The ITA set up its pioneering scientific 
department at Tocklai, Assam in 1913? and the UPASI set up four research 
stations in 1919, Work was also initiated on the chemistry of tea and 
its manufacturing. These pioneering research stations produced major 
breakthroughs in seed growing, hybridization, vegetative propagation, 
pruning, shading, plucking techniques, post and disease control and 
improved methods of processing leading to the CTC method of manufacture 
(1, pp. 473-510).
The most important role of the associations, however, has been pro­
viding a forum for discussion on problem areas and bringing relevant
-25-
points to the attention of the government. Despite considerable coopera­
tion between the representatives of the industry and the government, the 
liaison between the two have not been very smooth— the major disagree­
ments being over taxation, export restrictions, labor benefits, incen­
tives and provision of finance on easy terms (18, p. 614).
INPUTS INTO ESTATE PRODUCTION OF TEA 
Land Availability and Government Policy
When tea plantations were set up, land was far from scarce. Most 
of the tea estates in Assam and West Bengal were established on lands 
obtained very cheaply tinder the "Waste Land Rules" under 99 years' long­
term leases. Even when purchased, the price of such land was only 
Rs 2h to 5 per acre. Clearing of the jungle and planting tea was much 
more expensive but, even then, most of the good plantations were pro­
duced at an outlay of Rs 300-500 per acre (15, pp. 56-57).
With increasing pressure on land, this has changed. In 1954, of 
the total land held by tea estates, only about 39 percent was planted 
in tea and 6 percent put to ancillary use— the rest was forest, bamboo- 
groves and cultivable land with considerable reserves for expansion (14, 
p. 442). Subsequently, the forest lands have vested to the state and a 
considerable part of the reserves have been adjudged "surplus to the 
requirements" of the tea estates and resumed by the state governments 
despite recommendations of the Tea Board for leaving enough land for 
further expansion. Scope for expansion of existing estates is limited 
by land availability. New areas for planting in Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh have been investigated and state incentives 
are available for opening plantations there, but little has been achieved 
to date (19, pp. 24-27).
Labor Needs of the Industry
The tea industry was, from the beginning, a labor-intensive one. 
Land preparation, cultivation, planting and maintenance of bushes are 
all labor-intensive activities, but plucking of tea is the most demand­
ing in terms of labor. C. R. Harler analyzed labor use in Ceylon 
estates (which are similar to Indian estates) and found that about 85 
percent of the labor input went to fieldwork and 15 percent to manufac­
turingand services. Harlerestimated2 4 3 mandaysperacreasthelabor 
input into fieldwork and this was divided into various activities (20, 
p . 154):
Plucking 52% 
Weeding 22% 
Maintenance 8%
Forkin g/manuring __________5%
Dusting/spraying 4% 
Bush sanitation 4% 
Green manuring 3% 
Pruning 2%
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When plantations were opened in North-East India, local labor was 
found unwilling, inefficient and inadequate and, from 1858, the system 
of importing labor from Central India was resorted to. The system, 
known as the "sardar" system^ provided an adequate labor force and plan­
tations flourished. The system, however, soon became oppressive and the 
laborer recruited through a contractor turned out to be practically a 
slave. Living and working conditions were appalling and facilities mini­
mal, resulting in high death and disappearance rates. This aroused public 
concern and a Royal Commission was appointed in 1931 to investigate. The 
Commission suggested regulation of recruitment and, gradually, recruit­
ment of migrant labor was controlled. Labor rules were also framed in 
the meantime and wages improved from Rs 6 per month in 1900 to Rs 11 per 
month by 1929 (1^, pp. 268-310; 15, pp. 62-64).
The role of migrant labor has been much minimized now as many of 
them settled down in the tea regions. There is, however, still occa­
sional tension between local ethnic groups and exmigrant groups over tea 
garden jobs which are scarce. The total employment in tea estates 
increased steadily through 1954 to reach a maximum of 1.09 million, at 
3.40 workers per hectare. Employment has declined since then though 
planted area and production both increased considerably— suggesting use 
of labor-saving methods. Current labor input per hectare has been steady 
at 2.13 over the last decade (Appendix Table V). Over the period 1951-77, 
labor productivity trebled while land productivity rose by 60 percent 
(Figure 6). However, the stability of the labor input per hectare in the 
1970s indicates that further labor-saving is not feasible and productivity 
gains in future will have to be supported by yield maximization.
Unionization and Growth Of Labor Benefits
While the industry was strongly organized from the beginning, the 
labor was almost totally disorganized till the 1950s. Independence 
brought with it a spurt in trade union activities,. and union membership 
increased steadily from 9 percent in 1951 to reach 40 percent by 1960 
(22, pp. 248-252). By 1969, there were 13 unions functioning in Assam 
and West Bengal, 30 in Tamilnadu and 26 in Kerala (23, pp. 64-65). Most 
of these were affiliated to the central trade unions with party linkages.
The nature of labor problems faced by the industry changed consid­
erably over time. Till the 1890s, the major problem was recruiting.
From early in the 20th century, the focus turned to regulating terms and 
conditions of recruitment and work. From the 1950s, with unionization and 
a great reduction in migrant labor import, the rate of labor turnover 
decreased and the labor force became more permanent. The major labor 
problems faced by the tea estates were in reducing absenteeism, increas­
ing labor productivity, and maintaining smooth industrial relations. On 
the labor side, the major issues were granting of "fair" wages and wel­
fare benefits, regularization of ’’casual" staff, regularization of work­
ing conditions, particularly of women and children who were an important 
part of the work force, and provision of employment for "surplus" labor 
(17, pp. 225-229).
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Following unionization of tea labor, industrial relations in tea 
depended largely on voluntary negotiations and collective bargaining, 
followed by conciliation and arbitration by state government officials 
and, in cases of breakdown of negotiations, have ended in strikes and 
lockouts. It has been assessed that labor relations in tea plantations 
have generally been smoother than in other major industries— cotton, 
coal and jute— and the number of man-days lost has been much less (17, 
p, 221). However, there have been serious waves of labor unrest in 
1955 and 1969 and, even in 1978, about 0.2 percent of man-days were 
lost due to strikes causing a wage loss of 0.2 percent of the wage bill 
and a production loss of 0.4 percent of the total production in North- 
East India (24, pp. 148-149).
Effective labor organization and growth of governmental control 
gradually won for labor improved wages and other benefits. The Minimum 
Wages Act, 1948, empowered the government to fix minimum wages for the 
industry. In 1960 a Wage Board was set up and it recommended a "fair” 
wage structure in 1966. On the basis of this, yearly settlement of 
wages takes place in regional negotiations between unions and producers' 
associations. Apart from wages, the customary benefits of tea estate 
laborers include provision of cereals at a concessional rate and provi­
sion of land for cultivation and grazing. In addition, a laborer is 
entitled to a CPI-linked Dearness Allowance, overtime allowance under 
the Minimum Wages Act and payment of bonus at between 8.33 percent and 
20 percent of annual wages under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. Social 
security measures include provident fund and gratuity benefits at retire­
ment under the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions 
Act, 1952 and the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The most comprehensive 
set of welfare benefits are laid down in the Plantations Labour Act,
1951. The Plantation Labour Act and rules made thereunder make provi­
sions for free housing according to specifications, free medical faci­
lities, free education up to the primary stage, water supply and sani­
tation, recreation facilities and payment of maternity and sickness 
benefits. The Tea Board and the state governments subsidized various 
welfare activities by about Rs 2 million annually in the 1970s, but the 
bulk of the resources were mobilized by the industry itself and added 
significantly to the cost of production. The most notable achievement 
has, perhaps, been in the field of health where, by the end of 1977, 
the tea estates under the ITA provided 32.4 hospital beds and 1.62 doc^ 
tors per 1000 workers— more than double the standards laid down in the 
rules (24, p . 128).
Since 1950, the money wage of tea estate laborers has risen steadily 
but the real wage, after a jump in the 1950s, has gone down steadily.
There also does not appear to be much correlation between real wage gains 
and productivity gains. Over the period 1950-77, wage and labor produc­
tivity in the Assam Valley estates have varied as follows (17, p. 180;
8, p. 73; 25, p. 114).
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1950 1955 1960 1965 1971 1977
Basic Wages in Rupees 0.87 1.62 1.89 2.07 2.62 4.80
Index of Money Wages 100 186 217 238 301 552
Index of Real Wages 100 196 178 145 139 136
Index of Labor Productivity 100 108 136 162 203 256
Capital Needs of the Industry
Establishing a tea plantation involves considerable capital invest­
ment in the form of land preparation, improvement, planting and mainte­
nance of tea bushes through a gestation period of 5-6 years. In addition, 
processing facilities, roads and housing are all capital-intensive. The 
Plantation Inquiry Commission, 1956, estimated the total capital invested 
in tea in 1954 to be Rs 1130 million, of which Rs 720 million were invested 
as "foreign" (largely British) capital. The capital investment per hectare 
was estimated to be Rs 3800 for sterling companies, Rs 3300 for rupee joint 
stock companies and Rs 1700 for proprietary concerns. Of this, 57 percent 
was held as paid-up capital while the rest was held as reserves (14, pp. 
33-37). It was also estimated that the net assets of tea companies grew 
from Rs 418 million in 1939 to Rs 561 million in 1946 and Rs 886 million 
in 1953— a growth rate of 8 percent per annum (14, p. 40).
From the 1950s, however, new capital investments in the established 
plantations were relatively small. Since most of the original 
capital Investments had already been written off, estates could carry on 
even under poor market conditions (26, p. 3). The net inflow of foreign 
capital has been negative in the 1960s and 1970s, and the long-term foreign 
investments in the plantation sector have been- steadily declining (1 1 , p. 
103).
Domestic capital formation has also not been adequate even to replant 
the old and uneconomic bushes and the capital value of the estates is, 
in general, going down. The rate of replantation of the old tea bushes 
has been only about 0.6 percent in the period 1950-77— much below the 
required rate of 2 percent per annum, necessary on a long-term basis as 
the economic life of the tea plant is 50 years. Capital needs of the 
industry for expansion are large. The average cost of replanting and new 
planting was estimated by the Plantation Inquiry Commission to be about 
Rs. 9000 per hectare in 1956 (14, p. 65). A USAID-sponsored study esti­
mated the cost including maintenance for five years to be Rs 12,500 per 
hectare in 197 1 (6, p. 17). Mario ha ran estimated the cost including main­
tenance for eight years at Rs 16,500 per hectare and the value of the old 
crop lost to be another Rs 27,000 per hectare (8_, p. 60). The Consulta­
tive Committee of Plantation Associations estimated the total capital 
needs of the industry to reach a production level of one million MT by 
the year 2000 at Rs. 10 billion spread over 25 years of Rs 400 million 
annually.(27,.pp. 38-39) ..-............... ..................................
As against this requirement, the funds made available to the industry 
have been far less. Tea estates require both short-term finance to meet 
working capital needs and long-term finance to meet development needs.
The Plantation Inquiry Commission estimated the working capital employed 
over 1951-53 at about Rs 3000 per hectare— about 62 percent of which was
-30-
met from their own reserves, 28 percent from bank loans, and 10 percent 
from other sources, notably from agency houses and brokers (14, pp. 153- 
158). Awasthi estimated that, by 1963, only 50 percent of working capi­
tal needs were internally mobilized (17, p. 256) and this is now believed 
to have declined considerably. While bank borrowings have increased 
considerably in scope, the Tea Finance Committee found that the smaller 
proprietary estates were more dependent on bank loans and found it more 
difficult to secure them (28, p. 38).
The situation in long-term finance was worse. Over the period 
1950-54, the retained profit per hectare was Rs 250 and the estimated 
net retained profit was Rs 81 million for all tea estates (14, p. 200). 
Over 1972-75, the net retained profit was only Rs 38 million (29, p* 
2121). The resources internally mobilized were far short of the need 
and the estates relied on long-term loans provided by commercial banks 
and government institutions such as the Tea Board and Agricultural 
Refinance and Development Corporation (ARDC).
The Tea Board operated three major schemes for long-term develop­
ment: Tea Plantation Finance scheme, Irrigation Loan scheme and Tea
Machinery Hire-Purchase scheme. The schemes were initiated in the 1960s 
with a total fund of Rs 150 million. Plantation finance loans were 
limited to Rs 11, 250 per hectare for plains estates and to Rs 13,750 
per hectare in hill estates while machinery and irrigation equipment 
loans are limited to Rs 500,000 per case. The net impact of the schemes 
has, however, been marginal— over 1975-77, the average annual disburse­
ment from these funds stood at Rs 11 million with another Rs 2 million 
paid as subsidy to facilitate replantation (29, p. 2121). The ARDC also 
provided refinance only to the extent of Rs 4 million annually in the 
late 1960s (17, p. 272).
The long-term finance currently available is, thus only about Rs 
60 million— far shorter than the Rs 400 million needed annually. During 
the entire Sixth Plan period (1978-83), the Planning Commission, esti­
mated an investment of Rs 536 million annually— with Rs 48 million pro­
vided by the Tea Board and Rs 120 million by the industry with the 
remaining Rs 368 million to be funded by bank loans— but, in the back­
drop of current achievements, the target appears to be very optimistic 
(30, p. 1322).
PROFITABILITY AND STRUCTURE OF COSTS 
Indices of Profitability
Profitability in investments in tea have generally been at a low 
level. Net profits as a percentage of net worth in tea have been well 
below the index in other industries surveyed by the Reserve Bank of 
India except briefly during the periods 1954-56 and 1974-76 (Figure 7). 
Gross profits have generally varied from. 8 to 16 percent of sales in 
the 1960s and 1970s but net profitability declined due to a rising share 
of taxation in the gross profits. During low profitability, the share
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FIGURE 7. INDIA: TRENDS IN PROFITABILITY OF TEA AND OTHER
INDUSTRIES, 1951-75
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletins (various issues).
-32-
of profits distributed has been high and very little (if any) profit 
has been retained. The ill-health of the industry is also reflected 
in the declining debt-equity ratio and the declining current asset- 
current liability ratio, reflecting increased indebtedness and higher 
interest burdens. The number of tea companies incurring a net loss 
also increased from 15 percent to 42 percent during the 1960s (8_, pp. 
38-45). The variation of major indices of profitability over the last 
40 years has been as follows (14, pp. 199-205; 25, pp. 122-129):
Ratios (percent) 1939 1946 1950-54 ■ 1960-73 1973-76
Gross Profit/Sales 17.8 31.0 41.3 1 2 .8 1 1 . 2
Net Profit/Net Worth 
Tax Provision/
8.3 14.0 15.5 6.4 12.7
Gross Profit 
Retained Profit/
24.1 38.3 39.2 56.6 56.5
Net Profit 47.4 46.9 52.7 4.1 58.1
Debt/Equity 4.0 6 . 1 8.9
Current Asset/Liability 1.42 1 . 2 1 1 . 2 2
Determinants of Profitability
At any level of management, the profitability is determined by the 
yield, price, cost of production and the level of taxation. The fact 
that, despite continuous improvement in yields, tea estates have suf­
fered from declining profitability may be largely explained in terms of 
the low real price-levels, escalating costs of production, and increasing 
incidence of taxation.
Price Trends
Prices in Indian auctions followed the pattern of tea prices in 
international (London) auctions (Figure 8), and price movements showed 
two peaks— one in 1954 and one over 1974-78 corresponding to the two 
periods of high profitability. Over the entire period 1955-73, prices 
stagnated and declined in real terms (Appendix Table VII).
Trends in Costs: of Production
The costs of production have, however, been escalating continuously. 
Wickizer estimated that over 1938-48, the average cost of production in 
Indian estates increased three-fold from 7.3 pence to 24.4 pence per 
pound (31, pp. 465-467) but the prices also more than doubled over the 
period. In sharp contrast, cost of production increased steadily from 
the early 1950s despite stagnating prices. Cost of production per kilo­
gram of. tea increased from Rs 3.34 over 1950-53 to Rs 5.23 over 1966-70 
(14, pp. 72-88; .3, pp. 40-44). A recent study placed the production 
costs in Kerala estates at Rs 11.49 per kilogram (32, p. 133) in 1979-80.
The major components of the cost of production are labor charges 
and direct taxes, duties and cess (Table 4). The Plantation Inquiry 
Commission estimated 38-45 percent of the cost of production to be spent 
on labor charges over 1950-53 (14, p. 99). The ITA estimated labor
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TABLE 4. INDIA: COST OF PRODUCTION OF TEA, 1966-70
(rupees per kilogram)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Labor Charges, Salaries
and Wages 2.15 2.30 2.24 2.27 2.34
Duties, Cess and Direct
Taxes. 0.89 0.99 0.83 0.82 1.03
Packing, Transport and 
Selling Expenses 0.68 0.74 0.76 0,69 0.72
Field Work 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.54
Manufacture 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.45
Others, Including
Interest and Depreciation 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39
TOTAL 4.96 5.37 5.18 5.17 5.46
Source: Marketing Research Corporation of India, Survey of Indians
'Export Potential of Tea, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 43.
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costs to contribute 36 percent to the cost of production (26, p. 26).
Most tea industry representatives consider rising wages and labor bene­
fits to be the most serious problem with high costs of production (33, 
pp. 9-15).
Direct taxes and duties present the other rising burden on costs 
of production. Tea is subjected to a large number of taxes at various 
levels (Table 5). The most important of the direct taxes levied are: 
excise duty, cess and export duty, while sales taxes on marketings and 
corporate and agricultural income taxes are also important sources of 
revenue. The direct taxes, duties and cess are not only major revenue 
sources (Appendix Table VIII) but also add directly to the cost of pro­
duction. The rate of excise duty has increased from Rs 0.13 per kilo­
gram in 1954 to Rs 0.93 per kilogram in 1978. The incidence of direct 
taxation, cess and duties per hectare of an average estate stood at 
Rs 1200 in 1970 and this shot up to Rs 9100 by 1978, when a heavy export 
duty was reimposed. Taxation of the tea sector is, of course, important 
as a source of revenue (Table 6), but the major complaint of the industry 
is that very little of the capital mobilized is plowed back by the govern­
ment into tea. Against receipts of the order of Rs 600-1000 million 
annually, state investments have only been of the order of Rs 10 million.
Taxation of Tea Incomes
Taxation of the gross profits heavily saps incentives and reduces 
net profitability. Of the income from tea, 40 percent is subjected to 
central corporate income tax, while 60 percent of the income is subjected 
to state agricultural income taxes. The prevailing corporate income tax 
rate is 55 percent with a 5 percent surcharge, and even this has been 
found to be one of the highest in the world (34, p. 62). In addition, 
most of the states, in a quest for resources, started enhancing the agri­
cultural income tax rates till they exceeded the corporate income tax 
rate. The maximum marginal rate of agricultural income tax is now 69 
percent in Kerala and 75 percent in West Bengal and Assam. Sterling 
companies have to pay even higher taxes— 80 percent in West Bengal and 
85 percent in Kerala, The average level of taxation in North-East India 
is about 68 percent, which the industry found hard to bear (24, pp. 19-21). 
The industry has been seeking taxation relief, a uniform policy in all 
states, and limiting of agricultural income tax rates to the highest 
marginal corporate income tax rate. The direct and indirect taxes 
impactedsoheavilyuponteaproductionthat,evenduringperiodsof 
relatively high prices, the surplus retained by the estates was modest 
and the bulk of the price went to meet taxes, costs and margins of 
dealers (Figure 9).
Economies of Scale
..... A.detailed.study.by the.lea.Research-Association.found.60.percent.....
irf~h^re~l?TOductTorrniostrs~nn) be fixed~and 40 percent Lo be varriahie (35^ 
pp. 45-50). This clearly implies that smaller estates are at a disad­
vantage in terms of production costs while they also have significantly 
lower yields. Estates below a certain size would, therefore, be uneco­
nomical. Though no precise, agreed-upon measures of economic viability
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TABLE 5. INDIA: INCIDENCE OF TAXATION ON THE
TEA SECTOR, 1979
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Excise Duty:
Additional Excise Duty
Tea Cess:
Export Duty:
Central Sales Tax:
Corporate Income Tax:
Rs 0.42 to Rs 1.365 per kilogram (de­
pending on 2ones)
Rs 0.40 per kilogram on packaged tea 
(up to 25 grams); Rs 1.00 per kilo­
gram on packaged tea (over 25 grams); 
10 percent ad valorem on instant tea 
Rs 0.08 per kilogram 
Abolished since February 14, 1979 
4 percent aH valorem on tea sold to 
other states
55 percent tax and 5 percent surcharge 
on 40 percent of the income
STATE GOVERNMENT 
Agricultural Income Tax: 
West Bengal Sales Tax:
West Bengal Purchase Tax:
West Bengal Entry Tax:
Kerala Sales Tax:
Kerala Plantation Land Tax: 
Assam Passengers & Goods Tax
55 percent to 85 percent (depending 
on states)
8 percent on tea sold to other states;
3 percent on tea sold for blending in 
West Bengal;
1 percent on tea sold for resale in 
West Bengal
2 percent on tea purchased and blended 
in West Bengal and sold outside
Rs 0.1378 per kilogram on all tea 
entering Calcutta region 
5 percent on all tea sold for blending/ 
resale
Rs 20 per acre
10 percent on freight charges
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Education Cess 
Health Cess 
Road Cess 
Profession Tax 
Buildings Tax 
Chowkidari Tax
Water, Lighting, and Conser­
vancy Rates
\
As levied by local government units 
from time to time
/
Source: Compiled from various sources.
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TABLE 6 . INDIA: ESTIMATES OE TOTAL TAX REVENUES FROM TEA
(million rupees)
1971-72 1976-77 1981-82
CENTER: 443.5 708.4 ■ . 895.0
Excise/Cess 343.5 578.4 665.0
Income Tax 100.0 130.0 170.0
Central Sales Tax - - 60.0
STATES: 200.0 270.0 372.0
Sales Tax 120.0 170.0 240.0
Agricultural Income 
Tax 50.0 61.0 82.0
Other Taxes 30.0 39.0 50.0
TOTAL 643.5 978.4 1267.0
Source: Marketing Research Corporation of India, Survey of India's
Export Potential of Tea, Vol. I, p. 24. The 1981-82 estimates were modi­
fied by author.
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FIGURE 9. KERALA: DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER PRICE OF
ONE KILOGRAM OF PACKAGED TEA, 1979
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exist, most experts agree that the minimum size of a viable estate would 
be about 200 hectares (26, p. 25; _8, p. 33).
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Modes of Primary Marketing
Tea passes from the producer to the consumer through a complex mar­
keting system. The primary marketing of tea by the tea companies owning 
the estates is done in three ways:
©sales through auctions;
©direct exgarden sales; and
©direct exports under forward contract.
The total volume of sales of tea has expanded secularly in the 
postwar period. The volume of tea marketed annually (in thousand MT) 
has varied as follows:
1954 1957 1960 1967 1971 1977
240.7 310.8 321.1 384.8 435.5 558.5
While the bulk of the tea is disposed of through auctions, direct 
exgarden sales have gradually assumed higher importance. The percentage 
shares of the various channels of marketing have changed slowly (8  ^ p.
p. 759; 25_, pp. xii-xiii): 
1951 1960 1971 1977
Auctions 84.0 77.3 67.0 71.2
Exgarden Sales 15.6 19.2 29.0 24.6
Direct Exports 0.4 3.5 4.0 4.2
The rising trend of exgarden sales is generally taken to be an indi­
cation of indebtedness of tea estates so that they are compelled to sell 
quickly to recoup their working capital and may even be compelled to
■make.^distress.sales'-'.at.lower.prices-...It.has.been.established.that.....
exgarden sales fetch lower prices on an average and the Tandon Committee, 
appointed by the Government of India in 1977 to enquire into the market­
ing system, recommended1 monitoring of such sales by the Tea Board and 
marketing of at least 80 percent of the crop through auctions (24, pp. 
230-231).
"Role.of.Auctions.....
Despite a gradual reduction in the role of the auction system, the 
volume of tea marketed through auctions expanded steadily (Table 7).
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TABLE 7. INDIA: DISPOSAL OE TEA THROUGH AUCTIONS
(thousand metric tons)
1936-37 1952-53 1962-63 1972-73 1978-79
Calcutta 55.6 129.8 148.6 175.4 139.0
Cochin - 11.5 42.6 65.5 74.8
Gauhat i - - - 18.9 85.4
Goonoor - - - 9.7 21.5
Siliguri - - - - 1 0 .8
Amritsar - - - 0 .6 0.4
INDIAN AUCTIONS 55.6 141.3 191.2 270.1 332.0
(35.3%) (62.4%) (69.2%) (87.7%) (91.6%)
LONDON 1 0 1 . 8 85.2 85.0 37.9 30.5
(64.7%) (37.6%) (30.8%) (12.3%) (8.4%)
TOTAL AUCTIONS 157.4 226.5 276.2 308.0 362.5
Source: Tea Board, Tea Statistics, various issues.
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The role of London auctions has diminished radically, and London auctions 
only handled about 8 percent of the Indian tea crop in 1978. The domes­
tic auctions handle the bulk of the tea and the number of auction centers 
has multiplied over the years: Calcutta (1861), Cochin (1947), Gauhati
(1970), Amritsar (1971), Coonoor (1972) and Siliguri (1976). There are 
clamors for opening a new auction center at Agartala, Tripura. While 
diversification of auction centers has been acclaimed, it is also seen 
that opening of auction centers often becomes an issue of regional pres­
tige and may increase overhead costs.
Role of Brokers
At auctions, brokers act as middlemen between producers and buyers 
who may be exporters and/or packers/blenders. There are usually selling 
brokers representing producers and buying brokers representing exporters/ 
packers/blenders, though at Calcutta the same set of brokers perform both 
functions. The selling, brokers charge one percent of sale price as broker­
age fees and, against that, provide services such as inspecting, tasting 
and valuation of samples, counseling, providing statistical information 
and guaranteeing realization of sale proceeds. While these are positive 
roles, the system of auctions through brokers has been seriously ques­
tioned due to concentration of broking powers in the hands of a few bro­
kers. At Calcutta, four foreign broking firms handled about 95 percent 
of tea sales (Table 8) and Indian firms could make little headway. The 
oligopsonistic buying power of brokerage firms and their financial rela­
tions with producers raise questions of speculative market manipulations 
and have led some critics to doubt the auction system as a fair and equit­
able one (36, pp. 32-33, 36-38; 37, p. 63).
Wholesale and Retail Tea Markets
At the auctions, the ultimate purchasers are the exporters and domes­
tic blenders and packers. Exporters normally sell to foreign blenders 
and packers. It is the blender/packer who blends teas of different char­
acteristics into a mix under a particular brand name and undertakes the 
secondary marketing of tea at a wholesale level. The retailers finally 
sell the "brand name" tea in packets to consumers and at a considerable 
price premium. However, a considerable amount (67-68 percent) of the tea 
is sold to the consumer as loose tea, which is generally much cheaper than 
packet tea. The packet tea market is fairly concentrated; the two giants—
Brooke.Bond and.Lipton— dominate.80 percent of the packet.tea.market...'But
these two have only about 26 percent of the total domestic market and the 
rest is controlled by a large number of small packeteers and loose tea 
dealers. The domestic market is thus fairly competitive (38, pp. 9-12;
24, p. 215).
Figure 10 shows a model of the Indian tea market in 1977.
CONSUMPTION OF TEA 
Trends in Consumption Demand
Domestic consumption of tea was at a low level prior to 1950. Several 
promotion campaigns were mounted after independence and domestic consumption
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TABLE 8. CALCUTTA: CONCENTRATION OF BROKING POWERS
AT AUCTIONS, 1954-1968 
(percent)
Percentage of Tea Handled
1954-55 1967-68
J. Thomas & Co. (P) Ltd. 38.0 42,9
Carritt Moran & Co. (P) Ltd. 2 1 .0 20.5
W. S. Creswell & Co. (P) Ltd. 18.1 16.4
A. W. Figgis & Co. (P) Ltd. 19.5 14.4
NON-INDIAN BROKERS 96.5 94.2
S. Chatterjee & Co. (P) Ltd. 2.0 2.9
Tea Brokers Private Ltd. 2.9
S. K, Chakraborty & Co. Ltd. 1.5 -
INDIAN BROKERS 3.5 5.8
Source: Government of India, Report of the Plantation Enquiry
Commission, 1956, p. 761; and H. Roy, Tea Price Stabilisation— The 
Indian Case, 1968, p. 15OB'.
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FIGURE 10. INDIA: MODEL OF THE TEA MARKET, 1977
(Figures indicate flows in f000 M.T.)
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expanded speedily. Over 1951-77, the aggregate domestic consumption of 
tea increased from 72,000 to 300,000 MT and the per capita tea consump­
tion increased from 200 grams to 500 grams. Both the aggregate consump­
tion and the per capita consumption show a strong rising trend (Figure 
11). The consumption of tea in India was already the highest in the 
world, and was estimated to reach 350-400 thousand MT by 1980 (6, p. 84). 
The per capita consumption is still low but fairly significant at the 
Indian level of per capita national income.
The USAID-sponsored study found considerable regional variations—  
per capita consumption being highest in the tea producing states of 
Assam and West Bengal, followed by the urban, industrial regions of 
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Delhi, while the poor, rural states of Orissa, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan had the lowest per capita intakes.
In 1967-68, per capita tea intakes varied from 58.5 grams in Orissa to 
911.8 grams in Assam, the national average being 361.7 grams (6^, pp. 85- 
89).
Elasticity of Demand
Though tea is normally regarded as a luxury item in the Western 
countries, tea is widely consumed in India even by the poorest classes 
with a lot of sugar, milk, and even spices. The USAID-sponsored study 
included a household survey which found tea consumption to be signifi­
cant even in the poorest households and also in rural households, though 
consumption increased with income and urbanization (Table 9). It was 
also found that more than 50 percent of the households consumed tea regu- 
larly> providing a vast domestic market (6_, p. 1 1 0).
Tea faced major competition with coffee as a beverage only in South 
India where coffee drinking was well established. In the urban centers 
and in relatively better-off groups, however, it faced competition with 
soft drinks and alcoholic beverages which were much more income-elastic 
(Appendix Table X).
Tea is regarded as price and income inelastic in Western countries.
In India, as in other LDCs, however, the demand is found to be more 
elastic. The USAID study estimated the income elasticity of demand of 
tea in India to be 1.90 in 1970 (6, p. 101), while the FAO ad hoc working 
party on tea estimated income elasticity to be 0.91 and price—elasticity 
to be -1.60 in 1969 (39, p. 64). The high income elasticity indicates 
the possibility of domestic demand increasing more rapidly with per capita 
GNP growth, while the high price elasticity of demand has enabled the 
domestic market to absorb the excess supply in years of poor export pros­
pects and has cushioned the price impacts somewhat. The sensitivity of 
domestic demand to prices has, however, reduced the benefits in years of 
high prices. The government repeatedly announced its intentions to pro­
tect the domestic consumer against "abnormal" price rises and controlled 
market prices by levying export duty, restricting exports though quotas, 
and market participation through National Consumers1 Co-operative Federa­
tion (NCCF) and National Agricultural Marketing Federation (NAFED). While 
NCCF and NAFED made purchases in domestic auctions in 1977, their impact
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FIGURE 1 1 . INDIA: GROWTH OF DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF TEA, 1951-77
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was not striking. The tea industry, however, protested against govern­
ment action to regulate prices and exports over 1976-78, when conditions 
were profitable after 20 years and real prices were still not very high 
(24, pp. 22-23, 39-40).
EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF INDIAN TEA
Trends in Exports
Indian export performance in tea has been patchy. The volume of 
Indian tea exports has been stagnating from the early 1950s at about 
200,000 MT. The export volume (in thousand MT) has varied as follows 
(Appendix Table XI):
1950-54 1960-64 1970-74 1976-78
202 209 204 210
Over the same period, world exports have expanded at about four percent 
per annum, causing shrinkage of India * s market share.
In terms of value of tea exports, the same trend is displayed. The 
Indian share of world tea exports varied as follows (in million dollars):
1950-54 1960-64 1970-74 1976-78
Indian Exports 203 263 206 448
World Exports 453 624 564 1219
Indian Market Shares 
(percent) 45 42 36 36
There has been a considerable rise in the value of Indian tea exports 
and the unit value of exports during 1975-78, but in real terms, the price 
increase in 1977 is far less striking and the long-term trend shows a 
declining real unit value (Figure 12),
Country Composition of Tea Exports
The direction of Indian tea export trade also changed in the postwar 
period (Appendix Table XII). The major changes included a declining
market.share.in hard.currency markets and rising market shares in.several
LDC and East European markets. The market share (in percent) of Indian 
tea in major markets has varied as follows:
1950-54
United Kingdom 63
United.States...................36
USSR----------------------------—
EEC (including France, W.
Germany, Italy, Benelux) 16
Australia/New Zealand 15
Canada 47
1960-64 1975-77
51 35
...22............14..
--------66--------------------------------86—
19 15
12 15
31 14
-48-
FIGURE 12. INDIA: TRENDS IN EXPORT UNIT VALUE OF TEA, 1950-1979
Source: APPENDIX TABLES I and XI.
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The post-1950 period also saw a spate of bilateral agreements.
Over 1974-76, 44 percent of Indian tea exports were covered by such 
bilateral agreements and the major signatories were USSR, Poland, Iraq, 
Egypt, Sudan and Afghanistan.
Export Policy
The major problem with Indian tea exports seems to be the absence 
of a stable export policy. The export duty has been used as the major 
instrument to restrict exports and also to generate revenues. Export 
duty was first established in 1947-48 and over the next three decades 
it has been altered, abolished and reimposed so many times that the tea 
companies could not be sure about the seriousness with which the govern­
ment viewed tea export prospects (Table 10). In the 1950s, the Indian 
withdrawal from the International Tea Market Expansion Board coupled 
with heavy domestic promotion and an export duty seemed to indicate that 
the government was not serious about export promotion. Yet in the 1960s, 
attention was given to export promotion and excise duty rebates were 
granted to exported tea as incentives. Clearly, there was a basic con­
tradiction in the two different policy objectives— maximizing export 
earnings and making tea available at cheap prices to domestic consumers 
(26, p. 38).
In 1977, when tea producers enjoyed high prices after 23 years, a 
heavy export duty of 5 Rupees per kilogram was imposed— exports were 
cut from 222,000 MT to 166,000 MT and Rs 1319 million were raised by 
the tax. Yet, immediately thereafter, the government mounted an export 
promotion campaign and the Tea Board had an export promotion budget of 
Rs 15 million throughout the late 1970s (40, p. 64). High export duties 
clearly had priced Indian tea out of the world market and caused some 
market loss. The tea companies were in need of assurance that such 
taxes would not again be reimposed at short notice.
Promotion of Value-Added Tea Exports
A major thrust in export policy in recent years has been the pro­
motion of value-added tea exports— packaged tea, tea bags and instant 
tea. Major benefits of this approach are the much higher unit value, 
potential for market development and provision of local employment.
The average f.o.b. export unit values in Rupees per kilogram over 1975- 
1 9 7 7 w e r e (25, p p . 85-89):
Instant Tea 
Tea Bags 
Packaged Tea 
Bulk Tea
41.5 
37.3 
15.7
11.5
..... Positive export.incentives.have -been -provided In the shape- of cash
compensatory support at 1U percent of the price from 19/5 ancTT2% per- 
cent of the price from 1979, excise duty exemption for instant tea and 
excise duty rebate for packaged tea or tea bags. This has resulted in 
a ten-fold rise in the value of such value-added exports over 1973-78. 
By 1978, the share of such exports in total tea export earnings was
-50-
TABLE 10. INDIA: RATES OF EXPORT DUTY, 1947-80
(rupees per kilogram)
Date
Rate of 
Export Duty
Average 
Export Price
March 1947 0.55 4.02
October 1954 0.97 7.11
March 1955 
April 1955
1.37 ----------)
1.10
June 1955 0.55 .
August 1955 0.84
.
October 1955 1.10 y 6.io
January 1956 0.84
December 1956 1.10
February 1957 0.84
May 1957 0.55
August 1957 0.84 ----------
October 1958 0.57 5.97
March 1959 0.53 6.10
March 1961 0.44 5.95
March 1962 0.25 5.87
March 1963 - 5.86
June 1966 2.00 >- 8.21
November 1966 0.80-3.00
May 1967 0.60-.276 8.32
March 1969 0.60-1.70 7.15
March 1970 - 9.08
April 1977 5.00 25.45
September 1978 2.00 18.00
February 1979 - 15.30
Source: Tea Board, Tea Statistics, various issues.
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ab ove one-fifth (Table 11). India has become the world’s largest pack­
age tea exporter, but such exports are concentrated in the Middle-East. 
Attempts to penetrate the more lucrative British and European markets 
have met with resistance from established blenders. Indian exporters 
could not make much headway against competition particularly as they 
lacked sophisticated packaging methods, aggressive selling techniques 
and funds needed to establish brand names (41, pp. 2-3; 42, pp. 11-13).
PROSPECTS OF INDIAN TEA 
Projections of Production and Exports
Current trends in production and domestic consumption of tea suggest 
that, by the year 2000, Indian production of tea will reach 792±72 thou­
sand MT while the domestic consumption, on the basis of the UN medium 
population variant, is expected to reach 716±60 thousand MT. The net 
export availability, under current trends of production and consumption, 
is expected to decrease from a current level of 200,000 MT to about 75,000 
MT over 1980-2000 (Figure13). India's market share is also expected to 
decline form 22 percent to 6 percent over this period. A brisker growth 
in per capita income than that experienced over 1950-77 could further 
reduce the export availability. This raises the very real possibility 
that India might have to become a net importer early in the 21st century.
The Needed Impetus from Government
Clearly, the prospects of becoming a tea importer are not appealing 
to the national government and, in national interests, the current trends 
will have, to be reversed and the tea sector used as an "engine of growth" 
to expand export earnings and provide additional employment. The tea 
companies, by themselves, will not be able to reverse the trends as they 
do not have access to the enormous capital needs of the expansion needed 
to reverse such trends and have, in any case, very little incentive to 
invest in so unprofitable a business. The government has to play a dy­
namic role in all this— to take positive steps in improving profitability 
of the tea industry, to provide incentives to investment, to make avail­
able the needed finance on reasonable terms and to continue international 
efforts at demand promotion and improvement in terms of trade. Above 
all, the government and the industry will have to close ranks and work 
together rather than on opposite sides.
Historic Role of the Government
Historically, however, the government played a passive role in the 
development of the tea industry. Government gave the tea companies 
assistance in the early days by making cheap land available and placing 
few restrictions on their expansion. Gradually, the need to tax the tea
sector arose.and'-the.Indian.Tea.Cess.Committee.was.set up.in 1903 to
administer the cess levied on tea, which was supposed to fund publicity 
and promotion in foreign markets. In 1937, the Tea Cess Committee was 
reconstituted as the Indian Tea Market Expansion Board, with broader
-52-
TABLE 11. INDIA: VALUE-ADDED TEA EXPORTS
(million rupees)
Packaged
Tea
Instant
Tea
Tea
Bags
Total
Value-Added
Exports
Percentage 
of Total 
Export Earnings
1965 11 - - 11 1.0
1966 25 1 - 26 1.7
1967 24 2 - 26 1.4
1968 35 2 - 37 2.4
1969 31 7 - 38 3.0
1970 37 11 - 48 3.2
1971 44 8 - 52 3.2
1972 47 8 2 57 3.9
1973 50 9 4 63 4.3
1974 84 9 3 95 4.3
1975 173 19 6 198 8.3
1976 194 25 11 229 7.8
1977 520 31 19 5 70 10.1
1978 655 31 11 697 21.2
Source: Tea Board of India, Tea Statistics, various issues.
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participation from the industry. The ITMEB did good publicity work abroad 
but was abolished by the national government after independence.
An Indian Tea Licensing Committee was set up in the meantime in 1933 
to regulate planting of tea and export of tea and tea seeds in the spirit 
of the International Tea Agreement. The government also increasingly 
came to play a regulatory role with the industry, particularly in the 
fields of labor welfare and taxation. But, apart from promotion, the 
government had no developmental role to play before independence.
The Tea Board in a Developmental Role
The Tea Act of 1953 repealed all the previous institutions dealing 
with tea matters and set up the Tea Board in 1954 as the central agency 
dealing with tea policy. The Board has representatives from the govern­
ment, industry, consumers, dealers and political constituencies and pro­
vides a major forum for policy discussions and decisions.
The major responsibilities of the Tea Board are:
©improvement of quality and productivity of tea;
©regulation of production, manufacture, sale, export, blending 
and trade of tea through licensing and registration;
©promotion of demand;
©coordination of research and development work;
©extension of financial assistance;
•improvement of service conditions of estate labor; and 
©collection of information and statistics.
The achievements of the Board have been mixed. The Board has insti­
tutionalized data collection and set up channels of communication with the 
industry. Tea research had been left almost entirely to the Tea Research 
Association, a private body funded by tea producers' associations until 
1979 when the Board set up its own research station at Kurseong. The Board 
had also undertaken some applied economic research to investigate the prob­
lems and prospects of some regions. The Board has operated promotion cam­
paigns abroad, but these bave: yielded little concrete results and the adminis 
trative costs have been high. In the most vital sector of providing incen­
tives to investments in replanting and modernization, the Board has operated 
some loan and subsidy schemes, but they have had only a marginal impact and 
have not been able to stop the disinvestment of the estates.
Other Policy Issues
The Tea Board, however, does not operate in a vacuum and other policy 
issues over which the Board has little control also impinge on the health
-55-
of the industry. A major problem area has been the land reforms policy 
of the states which has been at cross-purposes with the industry's need 
of land for expansion. Fiscal policies of the central and the state 
governments affect the profitability and cost of production. Monetary 
policies of the Reserve Bank affect the availability of credit. Finally, 
the export policy of the Commerce Ministry and institutional arrangements 
for market stabilization directly affect tea prices, but the Tea Board 
has little control over such issues.
Nevertheless, if the gloomy prognosis for Indian tea is to be chal­
lenged, concerted action will have to be launched in all these policy 
arenas. Different policy instruments of the government will have to be 
effectively coordinated and the basic problem— inducing investments into 
tea to reduce unit costs and increase export availability— will have to 
be addressed, and the task can only be achieved by the government and 
the industry working together.
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CHAPTER III, THE WORLD TEA ECONOMY
AN OVERVIEW OF TEA PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
General Trends of Production
The major tea producing nations of the world expanded their planted 
areas in different time-periods. The Classic far-eastern producers, 
China and Japan, had major expansions by the late nineteenth century.
The traditional plantation economies of India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia 
had their major expansions over 1870-1930. The "new" producers, namely 
the East African countries, USSR and Turkey, had large-scale expansions 
over the period 1950-80.
The postwar period has seen an expansion of plantings at a steady 
rate of about 2 percent per annum. On a global basis, the tea hectarage 
growth has been impressive:
1948-52 1961-65 1976-78
994,000 1,250,000 1,582,000
but the pattern shows large regional variations (Appendix Table XIII). 
While China devoted her energies to rehabilitation of old planted areas, 
Indian and Sri Lankan planted areas increased at less than one percent 
per annum. The largest expansion took place in Africa, where planted 
areas increased five-fold in the last 30 years, the leading performer 
being Kenya where the area planted to tea increased ten-fold over the 
period.
Production of tea increased at a rate above six percent per annum 
over the postwar period resulting in a staggering production increase 
of over a million tons over 1950-77. The global production of tea in 
thousand metric tons increased as follows:
1948-52 1961-65 1976-78
...................6.4.0............ 1,085........... 1,730...................
Production gains were achieved through intensive and extensive 
developments in the postwar period though there were large regional 
variations (Appendix Table XIV). All major producers, however, made 
serious production gains over the period 1950-77 (Figure 14). Indian 
tea production doubled over this period, Chinese production rose five­
foldbut still stood at little above prewar levels, African production..
stagnated and declined from 1965.
The net result was a large expansion along with considerable reduc­
tion of concentration from the prewar composition of the tea industry. 
The four biggest producers of the prewar period— China, India, Ceylon 
and Indonesia— controlled above 88 percent of the production in 1934-38.
-59-
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Today, their share is less than 65 percent. The largest expansion has 
been shown by the African producers, from about one percent in the 1930s 
to above 10 percent in the late 1970s.
General Trends of Exports
World exports have also grown steadily in the postwar period. Global 
tea exports (in thousand MT) have increased as follows:
1948-52 1961-65 1976-78
430 600 860
But, despite a doubling of export levels, the rate of export growth of 
3.7 percent per annum has lagged behind the production growth rate of 6.3 
percent per annum over this period. This has been due to a slower growth 
of import demand and promotion of domestic demand in all producing coun­
tries, notably in India.
Growth of exports displayed a pattern widely varying from region to 
region (Figure 15). Indian and Sri Lankan tea exports have been stag­
nating at around 200,000 MT from 1960, while African exports increased 
steadily and more than seven-fold over the post-1950 period.
The reduction in concentration of world exports has been even more 
marked. The "big four"— India, Ceylon, Indonesia and China— controlled 
above 88 percent of the world export market in 1934-38. Today, their 
share has fallen to less than 60 percent, while the share of the African 
countries has risen from less than two percent to 20 percent.
Due to the rising impact of domestic consumption, the export-produc­
tion ratio has declined from about two-thirds in the early 1950s to less 
than half by the late 1970s, through the role of the export sector varied 
widely from country to country. The share of the crop exported in 1978 
stood at above 90 percent in Sri Lanka and major African producers, 30 
percent in India, and 20 percent in China. Of the major producers, USSR 
and Japan were net importers and Turkey only a marginal exporter.
The country composition of exports has also changed radically over 
the last 40 years (Figure 16). The strong dependence of Indian and Sri 
Lankan exports on the markets of the United Kingdom and the traditional 
Western importing countries— Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United' States, 
South Africa, and Ireland— decreased and market dependence on the Middle 
Eastern countries increased. India was also able to carve out a large 
East European market, largely due to bilateral agreements with USSR and 
Poland. Only the African countries were able to expand their markets in 
the United Kingdom and the traditional Western countries in the postwar 
period— at.the.expense.of.India.and.Sri.Lanka...............................
The Nature of the Competition in the World Market
Competition in the world market has increased considerably over the 
postwar period. This has been due to narrowing down of yield gaps and
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EIGURE 16. WORLD: TRENDS IN TEA EXPORTS, 1934-38 - 1976-78
Source: APPENDIX TABLE XV
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price gaps and also due to the cost advantages of new entrants to the 
tea trade.
Over the last 30 years, yields in most producing countries have 
increased considerably. The yield-gains have been caused by replanting 
with better quality material, improvements in agricultural techniques—  
particularly planting, pruning and fertilization— and the relative free­
dom from serious diseases and pests (1_, p. 7). The yield-gains have 
been particularly dramatic in the cases of USSR and Malawi, both of 
which had low yield levels in the early 1950s, and the range of yield 
variations has been considerably narrowed down over 1950-80 (Figure
17) . Whereas in 1950, Japanese yields were far ahead of all other pro­
ducers, current yield levels in Japan, Malawi, Turkey, India and USSR 
are pretty close. Yield levels in Sri Lanka and Kenya have, however, 
stagnated over the period. This has been attributed to uncertainties 
over the nationalization issue in Sri Lanka and the very rapid growth 
of smallholder tea production in Kenya with a correspondingly high pro­
portion of immature tea.
Traditionally, the comparative advantage of Indian and Sri Lankan 
tea was maintained through their superior quality, particularly of the 
highland production, as this superior quality fetched them considerable 
price premiums. Over 1955-57, North Indian and Ceylon tea fetched at 
least a 30 percent premium over Kenyan, Malawian and Indonesian tea.
This price premium was gradually eroded over the period 1955-80 (Figure
18) and, in recent years, Kenyan tea has been fetching top prices at 
London auctions. The quality improvement of African tea is certainly 
discernible but the trend also reflects a shift in demand for "filler" 
teas with the rising popularity of tea bags and instant tea (2_, p, 61).
It has also been held that there has been general quality deterioration 
of Indian and Ceylonese tea due to "coarse" plucking and a shrinking 
share of the quality upland tea (3_, pp. 37, 50).
Apart from these factors, the cost of production in the old plan­
tation economies of India and Sri Lanka were, on an average, consider­
ably higher than cost of production in the East African estates. Both 
land and labor were considerably cheaper in East Africa (4_, p. 100). 
and levels of taxation were much lower. A World Bank study found that 
duties and taxes were at a much higher level for India and Ceylon—  
accounting for 60-80 percent of the gross margin or pretax profits (3_, 
p. 4). The net result was a striking difference in profitability from 
tea investments between India and Ceylon on the one hand and East Afri­
can countries on the other (Table 12). The much higher profitability 
of tea investments in Africa coupled with apprehensions over the security 
of investments in India and Sri Lanka after their independence led a 
number of tea companies to divert profits from India and Sri Lanka and 
invest in East Africa, Notably, James Finlay and Brooke-Bond-Liebig 
invested heavily in East Africa, and such continuous investments there 
coupled with disinvestments in India and Sri Lanka further eroded the 
comaprative advantage of India and Sri Lanka. Large-scale smallholder 
production further reduced production costs in Kenya (5_, p. 255).
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FIGURE 17. YIELD TRENDS OF TEA OF SELECTED PRODUCERS
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, various issues.
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The differences in profitability in tea investments led the World 
Bank to recommend diversification out of tea in India and Sri Lanka, 
while it made available $26.1 million in IDA loans to East Africa over 
1964-72 (2^  p. 73). Such diversification has not been taken very seri­
ously by India and Sri Lanka in view of the difficulties of such adjust­
ments and the unattractiveness of alternative crops from the export 
point of view (3^  pp. 3, 31).
Production Strategies of Major Competitors
Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan production strategy in the field of tea 
changed radically over the last decade. The structure of the Sri Lankan 
tea economy was very similar to the structure in India. Smallholdings 
comprised only 17 percent of the acreage in 1967 and large estates, 
typically owned by sterling companies, dominated the production. The 
state largely played a role in taxation and tea export duty, ad valorem 
sales tax and cess provided major sources of revenue (6 ,^ pp. 19-20; _3, 
pp. 42 -44 ) .
Perturbed by the loss of markets, the Sri Lankan government also 
relied on subsidies to encourage replanting and to introduce techno­
logical changes. The Sri Lanka Tea Board operated three major subsidy 
schemes involving tea replanting, tea fertilization and tea factory 
development to encourage private investments and to expand production 
and exports. In spite of these incentives, however, the rate of replant­
ing never exceeded one percent against the optimal rate of two percent 
per annum. The low profitability appeared to inhibit private investments 
in tea (3^  pp. 45-49).
The production of tea (in thousand MT) stagnated from the mid-1960s:
1961-65 1969-71 1976-78
217 215 201
and export availability was restricted. On top of this, the Bandaranaike 
government introduced land reform laws in 1972 and 1975 limiting private 
ownership of tea land to 50 acres. The government also announced its 
intentions to nationalize the tea estates, and alienation of prime tea 
land and the threat of nationalization further deterred investments in 
the mid-1970s (7_, p. 36).
However, by 1979, the nationalization of tea companies had been com­
pleted and two state public sector corporations controlled 80 percent of 
the production. Competent managers have been retained for the estates 
even after nationalization and the situation is believed to have stabi­
lized. However, it remains to be seen how effectively the government 
can directly fund tea development after nationalization (8, pp. 6-7).
The second major change has been caused by the land reforms policy. 
The smallholders controlled no less than 38 percent of the crop acreage 
by 1979. Emphasis has been laid on incorporating smallholders in the 
national production strategy and a minimum price of 70 cents per kilo­
gram of green leaves has been guaranteed from October 1980 09, pp. 26- 
27). Major development projects are being initiated to rehabilitate
-69-
smallholder tea areas with finance from the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank.
Current Sri Lankan plans envisage an investment of Rs 125 million 
annually for five years (10, pp. 56-57). In addition, the government 
raised replanting subsidies and reduced export duty and ad valorem 
taxes in 1979 (11, p. 6). It is expected that the stalemate will cease 
and Sri Lankan output begin to increase, though a lot depends on the 
efficiency of the nationalized plantation corporations.
China. Not much is known about actual Chinese production and 
export plans. Tea in China was cultivated in the hilly regions of 
Central and South China, typically by smallholders who processed green 
tea in small processing units. Production was serious hampered by the 
Second World War, but postwar rehabilitation was achieved systematically 
through organization of growers’ cooperatives, channelization of long­
term loans, Improved processing and blending facilities and applied 
research. At the same time, production was reorganized through produc­
tion teams and brigades as in other crops (1_, p. 48). By the late 1970s, 
China was consistently producing above 300,000 MT annually— a higher 
level of production than before the war.
The Chinese impact on the world market was very modest in the 1950s 
and 1960s— her share of the world export market stood only at about five 
percent. From 1970, however, China has made progressively larger market 
entries. Chinese exports (in thousand MT) over the decade varied as 
follows (1 2 , p. 10):
1970-72 1974-76 1978-79
45 60 90
and her 1979 market share was above ten percent. About half the Chinese 
tea exports now are black tea and, due to a low cost of production, they 
have created favorable market impacts in Australia, New Zealand, U.S. 
and Europe. Experts foresee a much stronger market entry by Chinese tea 
in the hard currency markets (13, p. 3 ) inthe near future.
Kenya. Amongst all "new" tea producers, Kenya most rapidly increased 
her tea production and exports. In the postwar period, Kenyan production 
and exports (in thousand MT) have been as follows:
1948-52 1961-65 1976-78 1979
Prpduction 6 17 81 99
Exports 4 15 75 86
Until the early 1960s, tea production in Kenya was confined largely
.to estates and, in fact,.cult ivat ion of.tea.as a smallholder crop was
forbidden until 1954. Under pressures arising from the MauMau revolu­
tion, the Swynnerton plan (1954) recommended introduction of tea as a 
cash crop for the smallholder. Initial developments were tentative and 
slow in view of the major problems of smallholder tea cult ivat ion — capital
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needs, quality control and the long gestation period. The first tea 
factory for smallholders was built in 1957 at Ragati and much-needed 
institutional support was provided by the Special Crops Development 
Authority (KTDA) (14, pp. 4-5; 15, pp. 7-8).
The KTDA provided the focus of development of the smallholder tea 
project and the dynamism of the Kenyan tea sector has largely been attri­
buted to the success of the KTDA program. The organization of the KTDA 
(Figure 19) comprised three major field activities— Nursery Development 
with vegetatively propagated, high-yielding stock and distribution of 
planting materials; Field Development which comprised supervision of 
planting and cultivation, licensing and regulation of cultivators and 
training; and Leaf Cultivation and Processing which involved inspection 
and procurement of green leaves through buying centers, their transport 
and processing through factories. The head office of the KTDA obtained 
finances from the International Development Association and Commonwealth 
Development Corporations, maintained liaison with other government 
departments and gave technical and administrative direction to the whole 
project. The program provided supervised cultivation of tea and ensured 
that credit and inputs flowed in and the leaves produced flowed out 
through KTDA channels. The success of the program has been attributed 
to its all-encompassing nature and autocratic control over growers (14,
pp. 1 1 -1 2).
The success of the program has been startling. Over the past two 
decades, the percentage of the planted area and production share of the 
smallholders have been:
1960 1965 1970 1976 1979
Area 6 21 45 63 56
Product ion - 6 21 31 45
The major achievements have been planting of about 50,000 hectares, 
owned by 100,000 smallholders, in this period, coupled with significant 
income improvements of the smallholders and opening up of the interior 
due to the tea roads and other linkages of the tea sector with the rest 
of the economy. It was also found that KTDA tea fetched as good or 
higher prices than estate tea, establishing that high quality can be 
achieved under supervised smallholder production (14, pp. 20-21; 16, 
p. 4).
Kenya is proceeding apace with smallholder tea projects. She has 
already installed 50 tea factories for smallholders and plans to install 
17 more by the end of 1982 in a World Bank-aided project involving
35,000 smallholders. The availability of suitable land is no constraint 
and only the prospects of world price drops affecting export revenues 
may deter continued large-scale expansion (17, p. 95).
Other African Producers. Performances of the other exporters have 
so far been patchy. The scope for expansion in the major African pro­
ducers— Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zaire— are enormous, 
but little of the potential has so far been tapped. Tanzania and Uganda 
have both enunciated policies involving smallholders as a major growth
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FIGURE 19. ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE KENYA TEA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
Growers (Sina 11 ho 1 dt,: r s)
Source: K. W. A. Oluoch, Labour Absorption in Smallholder Tea
Production in Kenya (Appendix II).
-72-
strategy . But problems over nationalization of estates in Tanzania and 
Mozambique have made production stagnate, and domestic political troubles 
have reduced production in Uganda and Zaire. Malawi has made steady 
progress but scarcity of suitable land restricts further expansion. 
Nevertheless, during the next two decades, African producers may well 
overcome these difficulties and make further inroads into the world 
market (18, p. 235).
Smallholders versus Plantations
The Kenyan experience has considerably altered expectations of the 
structure of the world tea economy. Traditionally, it was held that 
the estate mode of production was the only feasible one for commercial 
production of tea in view of the needs of heavy investments, availability 
of cheap and abundant labor, linkages with processing and marketing sec­
tors, access to technical information based on applied research and the 
economies of scale of large-scale operation (19, pp. 51-67). On these 
foundations were built the plantation systems of India, Ceylon, Indonesia, 
and early East Africa. The only exceptions to this pattern were the 
green-tea countries of China, Japan, and Taiwan, where peasant enter­
prises with on-farm processing dominated and tea was largely for the 
domestic sector (20, p. 17).
Wickizer analyzed the performance of tea production by smallholders 
in Ceylon and Indonesia and concluded that the poor skill and technical 
knowledge of the smallholders produced low yields and poor quality.
Tea was thus found to be ill-suited for smallholder production (21, pp. 
63-65). Gamble, on the other hand, of smallholders in Ceylon and Indo­
nesia attributed failures to poor soil, poor quality of planting materi­
als and poor cultural practices due to little or no supervision (14, pp. 
4-5). The Swynnerton plan accepted Gamble's conclusions and relied on 
the presumption that with proper selection of site and growers, central 
supply of planting materials and other inputs, an extension service 
teaching proper husbandry techniques and central processing and market­
ing, production of quality tea through smallholders was viable. The 
KTDA experience showed that smallholder tea production was indeed viable 
and has two major advantages over estate production— low cost of produc­
tion due to use of family labor and flexibility, since the smallholder 
usually does not rely on a monoculture for subsistence (19, pp. 124-125). 
In addition, smallholder production may be politically more acceptable 
and ensures that the profits accrued are spent locally (4^  pp. 97-102). 
These give smallholder production a distinct edge over estate production 
and future large-scale expansions are anticipated in the smallholder 
sector. In spite of the problems of finances needed to build up the 
infrastructural support needed including the extension service, the 
World Bank found smallholder tea projects in Africa to be highly desir­
able with an estimated "social rate of return" of 38 percent (22, p.
101) .
AN OVERVIEW OF TEA CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS 
Trends in Tea Consumption
Tea consumption in the world has expanded considerably over the 
last four decades. In the mid-193Qs, world tea consumption stood at
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half a million tons (excluding China) and, in the immediate postwar 
period, consumption was even lower due to supply constraints and ration­
ing in the United Kingdom. From the 1950s, however, tea consumption 
expanded at a steady rate of about 4.4 percent per annum. Estimated 
global tea consumption (excluding China), in thousand MT, increased as 
follows:
1950-54 1955-57 1965-67 1976-78
625 760 1030 1290
In addition, Chinese domestic consumption was estimated at 130,000 MT 
by the mid-1960s and is expected to have gone beyond 200,000 MT by 1979 
(23, p. 17).
However, the pattern of global tea consumption changed radically 
over this period (Figure 20). Over 1933-35, the developed countries 
had three-quarters of the world tea consumption , but their share dropped 
to half by 1973-75 and is expected to have gone down to about 30 percent 
by 1980 (18, pp. 234-236).
Of the developed countries, the United Kingdom was and still remains 
the largest consumer but British consumption has been stagnating around
200,000 MT over the last four decades and the British share of world 
consumption dropped from about 40 percent in 1933-35 to about 15 percent 
by 1973-75. Outside the United Kingdom, consumption was also high in 
the white commonwealth countries— Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Aus­
tralia, and New Zealand— which had 12 percent of the world market in 
1933-35. Despite some increase in consumption, their share of world 
consumption dropped to about 8 percent by 1973-75. Of all the developed 
countries, consumption has a secularly rising trend only in Japan, East­
ern Europe and the U.S. These three regions had about 20 percent of 
world consumption in 1933-35 and above 25 percent in 1973-75. Over 
1955-75, consumption in all three regions had a remarkable increase—  
doubling in the U.S. and Japan and trebling in Eastern Europe.
The steady growth of consumption of tea in the LDCs has been spear­
headed by a remarkable rise of consumption in the producing countries—  
notably India, which became the largest consumer in the world from 1970, 
All other producers also expanded domestic consumption but, barring 
India, China, and Turkey, none had a domestic market comparable with the 
export market. Outside the producing countries, consumption increased 
largely in West Asia and North Africa. The middle-east (including North 
Africa) expanded its tea consumption from 33,000 MT in 1933-35 to 196,000 
MT in 1973-75— a growth rate of 12 percent. Outside these regions, tea 
consumption was significant only in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Chile and 
most LDCs still had a very low level of consumption.
..... Over.the.last.two.decades..,.LD.C.tea' consumption.has.been.growing.at... 7
7 percenL while cunsumptiorr^ in deveitrp&d countries grew only at 2 percent. 
The net outcome has been a shift in the consumption pattern with the LDCs1 
share rising from 37 percent to 50 percent, and the shift is occurring at
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an accelerated pace now. Overall world consumption is projected to 
grow at three percent (2_, pp, 68-69).
Trends in Per Capita Consumption
Trends in per capita consumption bring the consumption trends into 
sharper focus. The per capita tea consumption levels in the world vary 
widely (Figure 21). Libya has now (1976-78) become the heaviest tea­
drinking nation in the world displacing Eire and the United Kingdom.
These three nations consume about four kilograms per capita annually 
while those in the 1-2.5 kilogram range include New Zealand, Australia, 
and several Middle-Eastern countries. Per capita consumption in most 
European countries is still at a low level-well below one kilogram per 
capita annually. There thus appears to be considerable potential for 
expanding consumption in the European countries, the U.S., and the LDCs 
provided the right impetus can be given.
In per capita terms, consumption in the traditional Western con­
sumers— United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa-- 
shows a declining trend while consumption in the U.S., Japan and Eastern 
Europe are rising (Figure 22). British per .capita consumption has been 
declining from a peak of 4.6 kilograms in 1956 fairly steadily, and this 
was only halted in 1975-76 as coffee prices climbed sky-high. The declin­
ing trend was resumed in 1978 (24, p. 3).
Consumption patterns in LDCs exhibit a wide variation (Figure 23) 
but generally display a rising trend. Over 1955-75, most Middle-Eastern 
countries display a rising per capita consumption trend— notably Libya 
and Turkey.
Trends in Imports
Import trends reflect the production and consumption trends of the 
regions. The world import level increased very little between the mid— 
1930s and mid-1950s due to supply constraints but expanded at a steady 
rate of about3 .5 percentoverthe nexttwodecades, the net imports(in 
thousand MT) varying as follows:
1950-54 1961-65 1976-78
450 610 850
Reflecting the asymmetric pattern of growth of tea consumption in 
the world, the import patterns also changed (Figure 24). Whereas the 
developed countries had 86 percent of the market share in 1933-35, their 
share dropped to 65 percent by 1976-78. Most notably, the British market 
share dropped from above half to about a quarter during this period and, 
with that, the center of gravity of the world tea market shifted from
London ° The other deve loped nations— U.S., Canada,.Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, and Japan— maintained their market share while Eastern 
Europe gradually became a major market. The LDCs' market share improved 
from 14 percent to 35 percent, most of which went to the Middle East. In 
the 1980s, the LDCs are projected to have about half the world import. 
market( 2 , pp. 6 8 - 6 9 ) . Thiswill clearlyexacerbatethedifficultiesof
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FIGURE 21. WORLD: VARIATIONS IN PER CAPITA TEA
CONSUMPTION, 1976-78 (AVERAGE)
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$
FIGURE 24. WORLD: TRENDS IN TEA IMPORTS, 1934-38 - 1976-78
Source: APPENDIX TABLE XIX.
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obtaining ,thardn currency for tea. The growth of tea markets in the 
Middle East, however, opened up possibilities of swapping tea for crude 
oil and both India and Sri Lanka had a series of bilateral agreements 
with Libya, Iraq, Iran, and United Arab Emirates (25, p. 45).
The import flows also changed significantly over this period 
(Figure 25). The new producers from East Africa captured much of the 
established markets in the United Kingdom and the traditional Western 
importers while India and Sri Lanka relied increasingly on the Middle 
East market.
Determinants of Demand
Empirically, variations in demand have been related to variations 
in price and income. Demand for a particular commodity is also affected 
by competition from substitutes, technological developments, quality of 
the product and promotional activities.
Elasticities of Demand. Classically, tea is regarded as a low-cost 
habit-forming drink with no substitute. Accordingly, the demand for tea 
is postulated to be inelastic with respect to both price and income varia 
tions (26, pp. 383-390). The analysis of consumer expenditure in the 
United Kingdom by Stone revealed an income-elasticity of demand of +0.04 
and a price-elasticity of demand of -0.26 (_1 ).
The current estimates of elasticity of demand show wide variations 
(Table 13). Generally, however, it appears that the demand for tea is 
fairly elastic with respect to both price and income variations in LDCs, 
while income and price elasticities are low in developed countries, par­
ticularly where tea drinking is well-established. Income can signifi­
cantly shift demands in LDCs and much of the demand expansion in LDCs 
and stagnation in developed countries can be explained in terms of these 
empirical parameters.
Compet it ion Between Beverage s. The major competing hot beverages 
in the world are coffee and tea. Traditionally, both were presumed to 
be noncompetitive, and coffee consumption was high in the U„S. and West­
ern Europe which were very minor markets for tea; tea consumption was, 
high in the United Kingdom, Eire, Australia, New Zealand, and South 
Africa, where coffee consumption was low. The only countries where 
there was some competition between coffee and tea were Canada and the 
Netherlands. Price relationships between coffee and tea were found to 
have only limited effects on their respective demands over the period 
1910-40 (27, pp. 70-71).
In the postwar situation, this appears to have changed radically.
The decline in per capita tea consumption in the United Kingdom from 
4.6 kilograms in 1956 to 3.0 kilograms in 1979 corresponded to a rise 
in coffee consumption from 0.7 kilograms to 2.5 kilograms over the same 
period (Appendix Table XX) and reflected a clear shift in consumer pref­
erence (3, p. 67). This took place in spite of declining tea prices and
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TABLE 13. ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR 
TEA IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1954-66
Country
Price Elasticity 
of Demand
Income
of
Elasticity
Demand
Developed:
Australia/New Zealand -0.93 0.31
Canada -0.87 0 .1 2
Eire -0.24 0.25
Germany (West) -0.73 0.59
Japan - 0.32
Netherlands -0.64 0.86
South Africa -0.32 0.69
United Kingdom -0.33 0.17
United States -0.34 0.52
LDCs: 1
India -1.60 0.91
Kenya -1.70
Pakistan CMCOo1 1.35
Sri Lanka -0.54 1 .2 0
UAR (Egypt) -0.50 -
Source: S. Singh, J. de Vries, J. C, L. Hulley and P. Yeung, Coffee,
Tea and Cocoa-Market Prospects and Development Lending (World Bank Staff 
Occasional Papers, No. 22, Baltimore, 1977), p. 64.
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rising coffee prices. Only in 1976-77, when coffee prices rose five­
fold due to the Brazilian coffee freeze, was there a significant swing 
back from coffee to tea. In all the traditional Western consuming 
nations, tea is steadily losing ground to coffee. Coffee has also made ■ 
significant inroads into Japan. It appears that tea is increasingly 
being regarded in the Western world as a cheap drink of low status and 
any promotional measure should attempt to build up the status of tea 
as an exotic drink (28, p. 5).
In sharp contrast to the consumption decline of tea in the United 
Kingdom and other traditional Western consumers, secular trends in the 
U.S. reveal a declining coffee consumption from 7.2 kilograms per capita 
in 1956 to 5.6 kilograms per capita in 1975 as against a rise in per . 
capita tea consumption of 30 percent over the same period, though Ameri­
can tea consumption levels were still low (Appendix Table XXI). This 
has been attributed to the growing popularity of iced tea in the U.S. 
in the summer, particularly amongst the younger age group, and coffee 
consumption has dropped markedly (by more than 50 percent) in the below- 
30 age group over the last 15 years (29, pp. 12-13; 30, pp. 28-29). It 
is also possible that the reverse trends in the United Kingdom and the 
U.S. can be explained by the desire of the consumer for a change from 
the routine.
Apart from the substitution between tea and coffee, both hot bever­
ages face increasing competition from soft drinks and alcoholic bever­
ages, the demand for both of which are much more income-elastic. With 
growing urbanization and rising incomes, such competition becomes signi­
ficant for LDCs also (3_, p. 15).
Role of Technological Changes. Technology has molded demand for 
tea to a certain extent, One of the major reasons why tea lost ground 
to coffee so rapidly was the development of "instant coffee" in the 
early 1950s, which simplified coffee-making to such an extent as to 
sponsor its demand. The major technological changes in tea have certain 
drawbacks. Teabags,whilefairly popular,arebulkierthanpackaged tea 
and add to freight charges (31, p. 793). Iced tea strongly promoted tea 
consumption in the summer in the U.S., but has not gained popularity 
elsewhere. The major brands of hot instant tea on the market are not 
quite savored by connoisseurs and a popular hot instant tea could strongly 
.................promote.tea.consumption.(29....».pp..,.1 2 - 13) .....................................
Another factor which affected the demand for tea in the postwar 
period was the change in processing technology. The modem method of 
processing is the crush-tear-curl or "CTC" method which produces small 
and flaky tea in a more efficient manner. Most modern East African fac­
tories use the CTC process and many of the Indian factories have switched 
overfromorthodoxprocessestotheCTC method(32, pp. 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 ) . Over 
the period 1961-/6, the proportion of tea manufactured in India by the 
CTC method increased from 30 percent to 60 percent. The CTC method, how­
ever, while it improved estate economics in the short run, eroded demand 
for tea in the long run as CTC tea produced almost twice the cuppage of 
orthodox tea. It has been estimated that over 1951-70, global consump­
tion of liquid tea rose by 145 percent while consumption of tea leaves/ 
dust increased by only 92 percent (33, pp. 9-10).
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The impact of technological change on the demand is clearly illus­
trated in the U.S, case. U.S. retail tea sales doubled over the period 
1958-73 and doubled again over 1973-79 to reach $750 million in 1979, 
but the composition of the sales changed radically (Figure 26). In 1940, 
loose and packaged tea sales comprised 92 percent of sales but this 
dropped to 5 percent by 1979, while tea bags and instants including 
mixes had 52 and 43 percent of the market respectively. In contrast, 
the British tea market has been much more conservative and, by 1970, 
only 10 percent of British consumption was in tea bags and less than 
1 percent in instants (24, pp. 3-4). Continuous technological improve­
ments catering to the tastes of an increasingly more sophisticated West­
ern consumer seem necessary for tea to regain its market share.
Quality. The definition of quality of tea is elusive and most tea 
blenders speak in terms of a combination of flavor, strength, briskness, 
and color, though the combination varies from blend to blend (34, pp. 
6-7). Cultural practices— particularly the coarseness or fineness of 
plucking, processing with modern machinery and packaging practices— all 
affect quality. With the Western market becoming more and more sophis­
ticated, the need for quality control has often been emphasized. For 
the domestic market and for most LDC markets, quality may be a less 
important factor than price (3_, p. 18).
Role of Demand Promotion. The declining status of tea, increasing 
competition from other beverages and the significant cross-elasticity 
between tea and coffee emphasize the role of demand promotion. Typi­
cally, tea has not been able to command the amount of resources avail­
able to its competitors for promotion. Over 1966-68, global promotion 
expenditure on tea ($3.2 million per year) was less than half that on 
coffee ($7.0 million per year)(3_, pp. 15-16). Advertising of other 
beverages has been even more significant— typically tea promotion expen­
ditures are less than 10 percent of expenditures on promotion of soft 
drinks or beer in Western countries (35, pp. 1114-1117).
Promotion of tea has also largely been uninational with India, Sri 
Lanka, and East Africa opening Tea Board offices and tea sale centers 
in Western cities. Such efforts entailed heavy administrative expendi­
ture and produced little tangible effect as the consumer encounters 
labels of major blenders which are mixtures of tea of different coun­
tries. Uninational promotion is of very limited use unless there are 
national brands on the world market, and penetration of Western markets 
by national brands is still insignificant. An effective promotion policy 
should be based on generic promotion and should work in close cooperation 
with the major blenders (36, pp. 72-75). The U.S. Tea Council has uti­
lized resources of major blenders successfully in a promotion campaign 
and has stimulated demand. It has often been quoted as a model but the 
success of other Tea Councils in the United Kingdom, Canada or Australia 
has been open to question (37, p. 240).
The need for institutional arrangements for generic promotion on 
the world market was met when producers agreed to set up the Interna­
tional Tea Promotion Agency (ITPA) in 1978. The ITPA went into opera­
tion in June 1980. The issue of funding for generic promotion is, how­
ever, still unresolved as the ITPA started with an interim budget of
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FIGURE 26. CHART SHOWING BREAKDOWN OF RETAIL 
TEA SALES IN THE UNITED STATES
Source: USDA, Foreign Agriculture Circular— -Tea (October 1980).
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$5 million funded by the producers, though experts consider that 2 per­
cent of export revenues would be needed. This implies a budget currently 
at the level of $16 million. It remains to be seen how effectively the 
ITPA can coordinate national interests and sponsor demand in the world 
market (38, p . 5; 35, p. 1116).
WORLD TEA PRICE PATTERNS 
Trends of World Tea Prices
World tea prices demonstrated considerable variations over the post­
war period. The United Kingdom tea market was the center of the world 
tea trade until the 1950s and the London auction prices are still taken 
as the indicator of world prices. During World War II, the British 
government controlled the tea trade in the United Kingdom, and London 
auctions were only resumed in 1951 when prices immediately jumped more 
than three-fold over auction prices in 1939. However, production costs 
also rose almost three-fold in the interim period (26, pp. 236-239, 466- 
469).
Over the period 1951-79, however, London tea prices showed a sharp 
upward movement only twice— in 1954 and 1977 (Figure 27)-— and both coin­
cided with Brazilian coffee freezes which drove coffee prices very high. 
Over the entire period 1955-75 tea prices stagnated and, after the peak 
of 1977, prices started declining again. The prices have largely been 
fairly stable in nomimal terms, the only really sharp movement being 
from an average level of 60 pence per kilogram in 1976 to 121 pence per 
kilogram in 1977, with the April 1977 price level reaching 187 pence 
per kilogram.
In real terms, however, the trend is more discouraging (Figure 28) 
and real prices can be seen to have declined steadily since 1954.
Even the remarkable price jump in 1977 could not fully restore the parity 
Blandford found that, over 1950-76, the volume of tea exports increased 
by 2.2 percent per annum while real value of exports declined by 0.9 per­
cent per annum— causing a real price decline of 3.1 percent per annum 
(39, pp. 65-66).
Supply-Demand Imbalance
The continuing deterioration in the terms of trade for tea has been 
seen in terms of a long-term supply-demand imbalance. Over the entire 
post-1950 period, production of tea has grown at about 6 percent per 
annum while world consumption has grown at less than 5 percent per annum. 
The steady decline in the world price reflected a steady supply pressure 
against a relatively static demand and created a buyersT market. Also, 
the prevailing low prices could not sponsor major demand growth in the 
developed countries as the demand was price-inelastic (3_, pp. 11-12).
The long-term supply-demand imbalance also caused stocks to pile 
up. The British tea stocks rose from 51,000 MT in 1950 to 127,000 MT 
in 1968 and have since varied around 100,000 MT (Figure 26). In the
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FIGURE 28. WORLD: TEA PRICES OVER 1950-78 IN NOMINAL
AND REAL TERMS 
(1978 BASE; YEARLY AVERAGE)
U. s . c e n t s / k g
Source: IBRD, Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1979), p. 41
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Unit ed Kingdom and the two major producers, India and Sri Lanka, the 
stocks mounted from about 100,000 MT in 1950 to 313,000 MT in 1976 (40, 
p. 30). Any excess in the level of stocks forced the price down, and 
the World Bank study found by regression analysis that change in the 
United Kingdom stocks of 10,000 tons was associated with a price change 
of 7.3 U.S. cents per kilogram (3_, p. 13).
Prospects for prices in the future also appear gloomy. With sup­
plies outstripping demand and a low global price elasticity of -0.3 (2_, 
p. 7), prices are expected to fall further in real terms. FAO projec­
tions indicate that, even with considerable consumption growth in pro­
ducing countries, exportable supplies are likely to grow at 4 percent 
annually while import demand grows at only 2 percent per annum, result­
ing in a surplus of about 150,000 MT by the mid-1980s and a real price 
drop of 30 percent (18, pp. 237-238). Other projections are even 
gloomier and Tyler considers the possibility of the real price dropping 
to 14.5 pence per kilogram in 1953 terms, or less than half the current 
real value by 1990 (41, p. 43).
The Cobweb Model of the World Tea Economy
The major features of the world tea economy are a relatively stable 
demand, persistent oversupply and deteriorating real prices. This can 
be explained in terms of the cob-web model which has been used to explain 
the behavior of most tree crops (Figure 29).
5 The price-elasticity of demand in the world market is low and the 
elasticity of supply is also low in the short run, in view of the heavy 
initial investment and the long gestation period. But, in the long run, 
high prices such as those prevailing in 1954 and 1977 induce some plant­
ings. The long-run price elasticity of supply has been estimated at 0.3. 
Due to the long gestation period, the production effect is only felt 
after six years and, even if prices are low by then, the planted trees 
are" harvested (adding to the oversupply) since the plants are perennial 
and the produceris keen to.recoverasmuchofhisinvestmentas possi­
ble. The time lag between planting and production and the disinclina­
tion to uproot the plant even during oversupply are the essential fea­
tures of the model (42, pp. 1-3; 43, pp. 22-29).
..... In.addition.,.the case for tea.is further.complicated.by the.compe- .
tition between African and Asian producers and the ability of the Afri­
can producers to expand their market shares and gross earnings by con­
tinually expanding supplies even in the face of falling prices during 
1950-70 (2, pp. 73-75).
DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING SYSTEMS
Role of London Auctions
In the early parts of the century, most of the tea in international 
trade passed through the London auctions, and London was the center of 
the world tea trade. In the postwar period, with the independence of
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FIGURE 29. THE COBWEB MODEL
Price
Source: Helmut F. Weymar, The Dynamics of the World Cocoa Market,
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968, p. 2.
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the tea producing countries and the relative decline of the United King­
dom as the consumption center, this has changed (Table 14). By 1979, 
only 12 percent of the tea was auctioned at London, the rest being chan­
nelled through the various Indian auction centers at Colombo, Chittagong, 
Mombasa, Djakarta, and Limbe.
The producing countries also had strong reservations about the London 
auction system. There were 19 active selling brokers and eight buying 
brokers at London but four of the buying brokers controlled 98 percent of 
the business (44, p. 93). This oligopsonist market control by a few bro­
kers raised fears of collusion and both India and Sri Lanka seriously 
considered withdrawing from London auctions. The Tandon committee appointed 
by the Government of India, however, concluded in 1979 that withdrawal from 
the London market could snap the remaining links with London-based blenders 
and lead to market loss. All major producing countries now seem destined 
to use the London auctions along with domestic auctions (45, pp. 230-231).
Nature of the World Tea Market
Quite apart from the concentration of brokers, the world tea market 
is oligopolistically dominated by a few large blenders. Four large blend­
ers— Brooke-Bond, Lyons, Typhoo-Cadbury and Co-operative— control 86 percent
of the British market (46, p. 21) while five blenders— Lyons, Twinings, 
Halpin, Barry and Millar, and Irish Tea Merchants— -have 90 percent of the 
Irish market (47, p. 38). The markets in Europe and the U.S. are less 
highly concentrated (37, p. 243), but the world market as a whole has been 
found to be fairly concentrated and vertically integrated, with the lar­
gest transnational corporation (TNC) commanding 25 percent of global sales
(48, p. 20).
This concentration, coupled with the linkages that some blenders have 
with manufacturing companies, has been viewed with increasing concern by 
LDC producers. This is also the most serious obstacle to increasing 
exports of value-added components from LDCs.
Fairness of Marketing Margins
The concentration of market power in the hands of a few TNCs has also 
led LDCs to doubt the fairness of the marketing margins of tea in developed 
countries. A study of the UNCTAD and the FAO revealed that retail prices 
of tea in the various developed countries varied widely, that the varia­
tions could not be explained by variations of duties and internal taxes, and 
that the marketing margin including marketing costs was on the order of 
60 percent (Table 15). LDCs normally believe that "inordinate" profits 
are reaped by TNCs in the European countries, and one way of rectifying the 
situation is by market penetration through value-added tea exports (20, p. 
60)........................................................................ ....
Role of Trade Barriers
It is generally held that tea is a tropical product, noncompeting 
with temperate products, and thus trade restrictions are not very signif­
i c a n t f o r  tea.UNCTAD foundthat only 8 percent ofteaimports.in 1962
were subject to duties and fiscal charges (amounting to $19 million) and
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TABLE 15. RETAIL PRICES OF TEA IN SELECTED DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES, 1960-62
Country
Impo rt 
Unit Value
Taxes and 
Duties
Average 
Retail Price
Costs and 
Margin
(cents/kg.) (percent) (cents/kg.) (percent)
United Kingdom - 4 201 40
Netherlands - 7 244 49
Japan - 35 362 59
United States - - 378 69
Italy - 42 485 66
Belgium - 7 558 78
France - 126 625 58
Germany - 53 766 77
AVERAGE 116.8 34 506 69
Source: UNCTAD, "Access to Markets for Primary Commodities," Pro­
ceedings of U.N, Conference on Trade and Development, Vol. Ill, Commodity 
Trade, 1964 (New York, 1964).
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that trade liberalization would bring expanded export revenues on the 
order of $6 million only (49, p. 35).
Currently, however, duties and taxes are significant in the Euro­
pean market and the important Middle-Eastern market. Duties and taxes 
are also fairly heavy on tea extracts, concentrates and value-added 
items. Accordingly, the potential gains from trade liberalization are 
much more now. A World Bank study showed that liberalization could 
earn LDCs an added $100 million in constant-1974 dollars per year and 
would also greatly help export of value-added items. However, few 
general gains have been made by the LDCs from the GATT negotiations, 
and the African producers continue to enjoy market preference in 
European countries following the Lome Agreement (2, p.ll).
PROBLEMS OE THE WORLD TEA MARKET
The major problem of the international tea trade is the declining 
real level of prices caused by general oversupply. Attempts have been 
made to counter this by demand promotion in developed countries but 
there has been little actual impact. The stagnant demand in developed 
countries has led the producers to seek markets in LDCs and sponsor 
consumption at home. Concentration in the distribution system also 
appears to have aggravated the situation and the producers' attempts 
to expand value-added export have not met with very conspicuous success 
generally. The situation also promises to deteriorate further unless 
current trends can be reversed.
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CHAPTER IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION
COMMODITY PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL' ACTION 
General Commodity Problems
The general problems facing most LDC commodity exports in the post­
war period are fluctuations in export prices and declining real export 
price levels leading to reduced real export earnings. Both problems 
appear to be stronger in LDC agricultural primary exports and acquire 
urgency in the backdrop of a steadily worsening balance of payments 
position due to the OPEC oil price hike.
The potential gains from price and income stabilization have often 
been questioned by economists. Hirschmann, for example, has argued that 
price fluctuations can provide a stimulus to the economy and that stabi­
lization may lead to inefficient deployment of resources (1_, p. 82).
Most economists, however, seem to be veering around to the view that 
export instability will affect export earnings, capacity to import, and 
investments, with the major cost being the deterrence of future invest­
ments (2_, p. 6). In measuring the impact of export instability on LDCs, 
Macbean found little difference between LDCs and developed countries 
over 1946-58 (3_, pp. 34-36). Later studies by Erb and Schiaro-Campo and 
Maya indicated that, in the postwar period until the late 1960s, LDCs 
were subject to much greater export instability (4, pp. 575-580; 5_, pp. 
629-641). Glezakos also found that export instability had a negative 
impact on real GNP growth rates in LDCs and thus, stabilization would 
appear to be a desirable policy for LDCs (6^, pp. 670-678).
The potential advantage of raising export earnings of LDCs by manipu­
lating the terms of trade has not been questioned, but the feasibility of 
such programs has been examined by economists and the prospects are found 
to vary strongly from commodity to commodity. There is a broad consensus 
that institutional arrangements backed by buffer stocking and/or export 
restrictions can yield substantial benefits to LDC producers if a broad 
range of commodities can be covered, but the costs are substantial and 
the benefits to individual countries vary substantially (7_, pp. 11-15; 8^, 
pp. 48-51).
Blandford has assessed the vulnerability to decline of the 13 most 
important agricultural commodity exports of LDCs in terms of trade and 
fluctuations (Table 16). He found that the real export price of the com­
modity group as a whole declined by 1.2 percent per annum and the real 
export value fluctuated by 8.6 percent per annum, measured by the coeffi­
cient of variation. He found that the problem of real export price 
decline was most acute for rubber, pepper/pimento, tea, bananas, and 
cotton, while the problem of real value fluctuations was most acute for 
sisal, pepper/pimento, jute, and sugar (9, pp. 5-28).
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Role of International Commodity Agreements
The major commodity problems have been seen in terms of supply- 
demand imbalances caused by yield fluctuations, demand fluctuations, 
cyclical boom-bust phases of industrial economies, speculation, long­
term supply responses, impact of synthetics, and long-term demand 
declines. The major institutional approach to a solution of the prob­
lem has been through International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) which 
attempt to redress the supply-demand imbalance by controlling the world 
market supply through a buffer-stock arrangement, an export quota 
arrangement, a combination of the two or a multilateral contract arrange­
ment (2, p . 5) .
Historically, attempts to negotiate ICAs were preceded by attempts 
to solve the commodity problems through national efforts. Such attempts, 
the most notable being the Brazilian Coffee Valorization scheme, had to 
be abandoned ultimately as controlling the world market proved to be 
beyond the capability of one nation. The depression in the commodity 
markets in the late 1920s gave an impetus to ICAs and the postwar com­
modity problems rekindled interest in ICAs. Recent international nego­
tiations in the UNCTAD and the "North-South Conference" have also 
focused attention on ICAs as an instrument of rectification of the 
market situation.
In the last 50 years, there have been a number of ICAs negotiated 
over nine commodities— bauxite, cocoa, coffee, copper, rubber, sugar, 
tea, tin, and wheat. In addition, informal cartelization without an 
ICA has been attempted to control commodity markets in bananas, bauxite, 
copper, iron, petroleum, and rubber. While cartelization usually has 
a negative connotation for importers, the ICAs were aimed at stabilizing 
fluctuations and improving terms of trade, which are of interest to pro­
ducers, and were also aimed at "orderly" marketing, which is of interest 
to both producers and consumers. Yet, on an average, such ICAs lasted 
only four years, and the price stabilization objective was not achieved at 
all in several cases— notably coffee and sugar— though export earnings 
were boosted significantly in several cases (8_, pp. 18-23).
ICAs seemed to function satisfactorily only if demand for the com­
modity was strong and the price inelastic, concentration in the market 
was high (with all exporters having nearly equal and stable shares and 
nearly equal costs of production), barriers to new entries were high, 
and major decisions were made by commercial interests, not governments. 
Most ICAs broke down over producer disagreements about market shares, 
exporter-importer differences, and attempts to sabotage the provisions 
with the help of major importers or exporters outside the umbrella of 
the ICA (10, pp. 195-202).
In spite of the historic nonsuccess of the ICAs, most LDC govern­
ments increasingly see them as the only solution to commodity problems,
ICAs in sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tin have been renegotiated in the 1970s, 
and informal study groups and intergovernmental negotiations were initiated 
in tea, rubber, jute and kenaf, hard fibers, bananas, and hides and
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skins (11, pp. 13-14). Most of the negotiations were sponsored by 
the international agencies, FAO and UNCTAD. The most significant 
development of the 1970s was the emergence at UNCTAD IV of the 
Integrated Commodity Program (ICP) involving 17 major commodities 
important for the LDCs, nine of which are more important or "core 
commodities"— cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, jute, rubber, hard 
fibers, tea, and tin. The ICP envisages a host of policy instru­
ments— international buffer stocking, production control, export 
quotas, market promotion and compensatory finance to support the 
different commodities— but relies on buffer stocking funded by a 
"Common Fund" to support most of the "core commodities." The 
UNCTAD estimated the fund needs to be $6 billion. Behrmann 
estimated that about $10 billion will be needed for the "Common 
Fund," but the program may yield real benefits on the order of 
$700 million per year to the LDC exporters (12, pp. 295-298, 
309-313).
Tea as a Problem Commodity
The relative stability of tea yields and tea prices led most research­
ers to conclude that tea was a fairly stable commodity in the international 
market (13, p. 20). Blandford also found that export revenue fluctuations 
were relatively minor for tea. In fact, real value fluctuations of tea 
were less than those of ten of the 13 commodities compared by Blandford.
But the ratio of real value instability to quantity instability was higher 
for tea than for 11 other commodities, indicating that the problem with 
tea was not primarily supply fluctuations but demand fluctuations and vaga­
ries of the distribution system (9_, pp. 21-27). FAO studies have also 
shown that tea price fluctuations considerably increased in the 1970s (13, 
p. 11). The impact of export price instability is strongly correlated 
with export concentration and is thus expected to affect Sri Lanka most 
severely since more than 50 percent of Sri Lankan export revenues still 
came from tea (14, pp. 127-132).
..... The.declining.real.price.trend.is.a.more.serious.problem.for.tea,.and.
Blandford found that tea export’s real value decline was worse than those 
of eight other commodities and the real price decline was worse than for 
ten other commodities ' (9_, pp. 6-16). The Asian Development Bank also 
found that the barter terms of trade of tea with cereal products declined 
from 100 to 61 over 1965-75, and tea fared much worse than the other nine 
agricultural commodities compared (15, p. 400). While declining terms 
of trade adversely affected all exporting countries, the African countries 
were able to expand exports rapidly and increase export earnings despite 
falling terms of trade. From 1955 to 1976, Indian and Ceylonese export 
revenues from tea stagnated around $200 million while African export 
revenues increased from $30 million to $154 million. This demonstrates 
thecomparativevulnerabilityofIndianandCeyloneseteaexporters.It 
"has been suggested that increasing stakes in tea of the~African producers 
has changed the situation (16, p. 107). Table 17 suggests that the lead­
ing African producers, Kenya and Malawi, are, indeed, more vulnerable now 
to tea commodity problems than India, and this has made them more amenable 
to acceptance of ICAs as a policy goal.
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TABLE 1 7 :  DEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES ON THE TEA SECTOR
- (N et) P e r c e n ta g e
Per C a p ita P er  C ap ita P e r c e n ta g e o f  E xport
Time- Tea Tea o f  Crop E arn ings
P e r io d C ountry P r o d u c t io n Consumption E x ported From Tea
( k g . ) ( M J ( p e r c e n t ) ( p erc  e n t )
193^-38
S r i  Lanka 1 7 .U5 O .85 96 6 5 . k
Malawi 1 .3 6 0 .0 5 96 k 6 . 1
In d ia 0 . 6k 0 .1 0 88 18.8
In d o n e s ia 1 .1 0 0 .1 2 91 8 .3
Kenya 1 .3 5 0.16 79 1 3 .2
Japan 0.78 0 .5 0 35 0 .5
China 0 .7 1 0 . 6 l lU h . i
1952 -56
S r i  Lanka 1 7 -8 2 1 .3 2 92 61.5
Malawi 2 .3 0 0 .0 9 96 30.0
I n d ia 0 .7 3 0 .2 5 65 16.2
Kenya 1 .2 0 0 .3 1 73 9 .2
I n d o n e s ia O.U5 0 .2 1 53 3 .3
Japan ■ 0 .6 8 O.98 15 O . k
China 0 . 1 k 0 .1 2 15 1 . 0
1976-78
S r i  Lanka ■ l h . h 3  ■ 1 .U0 89.8 h8-9
Malawi 6. oh ■ 0.19 96.8 2 0 .3
Kenya . 6 .3 3 0.76 8 7 .9 1 7 -0
I n d ia 0.85 0.58 29 -9 6 .h
China 0 .3 9 0.29 23 -9 1 .8
In d o n e s ia 0 .5 0 o . i h . 73 . k 0 .6
Japan 0.91 1 .00 - 1 0 . 0 —
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Tropical Crops (various
issues).
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Revlew of the International Tea Agreement, 1933-55
An International Tea Agreement (ITA) was put into operation in 1933 
as a response to the worldwide depression of 1927-33. In the early 1920s, 
tea consumption tended to expand with the return of prosperity to the 
Western world. Prices were fairly high— above 19 pence per pound until 
1927— profits to tea plantations increased and higher profits stimulated 
new plantings and coarser plucking to raise the output. Between 1921 
and 1930, tea production in India, Ceylon and Dutch East Indies rose by 
60 percent, exports rose by more than 50. percent and stocks in England 
doubled. This brought pressure on prices which dropped to reach 9.5 
pence per pound in 1933— half the level prevailing over 1923-27. The 
concern among the major producers produced voluntary crop restrictions 
in 1930 and finally led to the first ITA of 1933 (17, pp. 58-70).
The ITA made provisions for restriction of black tea exports through 
quotas, prohibition on new plantings and seed exports, study of consump­
tion developments and demand promotion through the International Tea Market 
Expansion Board and collection and publication of statistics. The signa­
tories were the tea planters' associations of India, Ceylon and Indonesia 
and were later backed by the concerned governments. This is in sharp con­
trast to current ICAs where governments are the only parties. In 1934, 
Malaya and the British East African colonies also became members and the 
ITA signatories controlled 97 percent of world black tea exports. Also, 
the nonsignatory countries, primarily green tea producers, China and Japan, 
were at war and could not exploit the ITA to expand their market shares 
(1I> PP* 72-84).
Over 1933-39, export quotas were restricted to levels from 7^ to 
17^ percent below "standard quotas" and the price immediately recovered 
by more than 60 percent. By 1938, tea prices had recovered far better 
than other tropical crop prices— cocoa, coffee, and sugar— both in nomi­
nal and real terms (Table 18).
In terms of recovery of terms of trade, the ITA was a clear success.
It was extended in 1938, 1943, 1948 and 1950, but due to favorable market 
conditions, no restrictions were placed on exports. In 1950, the African 
countries withdrew from the ITA and, with the failure to involve China 
and Japan in the ITA, the monopoly of the members over the world tea 
trade declined. The 1954 high prices also generated a sense of compla­
cency. By 1955, India, Ceylon and Indonesia agreed that the ITA was 
serving no useful purpose and allowed it to expire (18, pp. 27-29).
Review of International Negotiations, 1955-1980
The steady fall of real tea prices over 1955-76 concerned most pro­
ducersand internationalopinion again veered toward the possibility of
-an ITA.— From 1965,— the commodity problems of tea started— being dis----
cussed in international forums. The FAO Ad hoc Committee on Tea started 
the discussions in Sri Lanka in 1965. Gradually the FAO-sponsored Study 
Group, the Inter-governmental Group, the Exporters' Subgroup, the Promo­
tion Subgroup and the UNCTAD became the major forums where discussions 
and nogotlations toward an ITA took place .
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TABLE 18. PRICE INDICES OF SELECTED PLANTATION CROPS, 1925-38
(1925-29 = 100)
Nominal Price Index Real Price Index
Tea Coffee Cocoa Sugar Tea Coffee Cocoa Sugar
1925-29 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1930 85 60 67 56 - - - -
1931 68 39 43 44 - - - -
1932 33 48 47 37 53 77 76 60
1933 66 42 37 33 - - - -
1934 74 51 43 35 " ' - - -
1935 75 40 44 34 - - - -
1936 73 43 57 34 - - - -
1937 85 50 70 44 - - - -
1938 81 35 43 39 - - - -
1933-38 75_ 44 49 36 115 61_ 75 48
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The major bottleneck of the 1960s was the hiatus between the Asian 
producers, primarily India and Sri Lanka, on the one hand, and the Afri­
can producers, primarily Kenya and Malawi, on the other. India and Sri 
Lanka were losing ground and were in support of immediate restrictions 
on global supply with quotas based on historical performance. The Afri­
can producers, aware of their cost advantages, opposed restrictions and 
sought quotas which would give them an edge over India and Sri Lanka.
The FAO and UNCTAD were appointed conciliators, but no immediate solu­
tion acceptable to both groups emerged (18, pp. 128-129).
The first successful negotiation resulted in the Mauritius Agree­
ment of 1970, under which all exporters agreed to restrict exports to 
predetermined quotas. Following an interim one-year quota for 1970, the 
arrangement ultimately provided three yearly moving quotas from 1973-74. 
To satisfy all parties, however, quotas have generally been fixed gener­
ously and have played no restraining role whatsoever. The export quotas 
have always exceeded actual export performance by 2 to 5 percent (19, 
pp. 69-70).
The other major breakthroughs achieved were the establishment of 
the International Tea Promotion Agency (ITPA) in 1979 and, finally, the 
unanimous agreement in the UNCTAD-sponsored meeting at Blantyre in 1979 
to have an ITA to regulate tea supply to international markets. It was 
also agreed that the ITA would be based on a buffer stock and export 
quota arrangement. Despite the achievements, however, the working 
details of the ITA were yet to be worked out. The level of prices to 
be defended, the size of the buffer, stock, the operation of the buffer 
stock and its funding were yet to be sorted out. The subsequent nego­
tiations at Bandung and Salisbury in 1980 have not brought conclusive 
results and more negotiations may be needed before the issue can be 
resolved to mutual satisfaction.
Shape of the New ITA
There is general agreement that the mode of operation best suited 
for the ITA would be a buffer stock operation in conjunction with export 
quotas, as in the International Cocoa Agreement. The Experts' Subgroup 
on tea found buffer stocking technically feasible after drying for 4-6 
months in tropical countries and 7-9 months in temperate countries, 
necessitating rotation of stocks (20, pp. 38-39). Bennett had earlier 
estimated the annual storage cost for tea to be about one percent of 
its price and categorized tea as one of the cheapest commodities to 
stock (21, pp. 106, 191).
Fixation of global export quotas will have to be done more firmly 
with a view to restricting supply. Division of the global quota into
national.quotas is.likely.to.give rise to most.problems...The.Interna-..
tional. Coffee Agreements of 1962 and 1968 were, under severe strain due—  
to constant clamor for waivers and increases in quota and overshipping 
and transshipments through third countries until it evolved an enforce­
ment machinery and a principle for quota allocation on the basis of 
export performance and stocks held (22, pp. 81-91, 96-113; 23, pp. 183- 
184). The proposed ITA has to pass through the same dIf f icult period.
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Ether ingt on suggested that the African countries deserved quotas some­
what higher than their historic performances and that gradual accep­
tance of this point is gaining ground among Asian producers (16, pp. 
102-106).
The buffer stock would defend a price range— buying at a given 
floor price and selling at a given ceiling price— export quotas being 
brought into operation as price falls below a trigger price and being 
reduced gradually for lower world prices. No agreement has been reached 
on the price-band. The Blantyre meeting agreed to defend a.floor price 
of $2.14 per kilogram in 1980— lower than the earlier UNCTAD suggestion 
of $2.80-2.90 per kilogram in real 1974 prices (24, p. 5). This is more 
than double the current world price and it is doubtful whether the 
importing countries would agree to the doubling.
The size of the buffer stock would be determined by the width of 
the price band, the level of the floor price and the market conditions. 
The size of the stock, in turn, determines the cost of purchasing the 
stock. The Blantyre meeting agreed on a buffer stock of the order of 
10/15 thousand tons— much smaller than the earlier UNCTAD estimate of
90,000 MT (24, p. 5; 12, p. 65). Behrman estimated by simulation that, 
to defend a realistic price band of 15 percent width, under current 
market conditions, a buffer stock of 161,000 MT would be required. This 
would necessitate a cost of $238 million in real 1970-74 prices— more 
than double the UNCTAD estimate of $90 million (12, p. 37). Such an 
amount is small compared to the Common Fund requirements of $6-10 bil­
lion, but will have to be funded by exporters in case the ICP does not 
materialize (25, pp. 11-19).
The exporters have to sort out these issues before the ITA can be 
put into operation. Any buffer stocking arrangement requires effective 
price forecasting to work well, and the job of the buffer stocking 
authority in the ITA will be all the more difficult as tea is a com­
modity far from homogeneous. Outside the ITA, the major institutional 
support for the tea producers will be derived from the ITPA and the 
UNCTAD/GATT work on tariff liberalization and encouragement of value- 
added exports. Work of all these agencies will have to be coordinated 
to yield optimum benefits for producers.
A PANACEA FOR ALL EVILS?
The major question confronting the tea producers is: "What con­
crete gains can be expected from the ITA?" Studies of feasibility of 
using an ICA for price stabilization and resource transfers have been 
made by the Economist Intelligence Unit, OECD, and Hveem, and all of them 
rate the chances of tea as f,Medium (to Low)" to "Medium/High" (26, pp. 
113-117).
The positive points for an ITA, from the points of view of effi­
ciency and justice, are:
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©More than 94 percent of the tea exports are from the 
poorest countries with income below $500 per year (27, 
p. 254).
©Exports are fairly concentrated with the top four 
exporters controlling 65 percent of the market (8^  
p. 70).
©Demand is inelastic with the global price elasticity 
estimated at -0.3 (28, p. 7).
On the negative side are:
©Cohesion among exporters is weak (26, p. 115).
©The world market is controlled by a few Transnational 
Corporations (26, p. 20).
©Demand has been declining in developed countries, LDCs 
already have about half the export market and the ethics 
of large-scale resource-transfers may cause rifts in 
the forum of LDCs, the Group of 77.
©Rapidly growing market shares and lower costs of pro­
duction of African exporters may add to the producer 
discord.
In any case, the relative advantages of the ITA in the 1930s related 
to world market concentration and decision-making by commercial inter­
ests and these advantages do not exist to the same extent today. Cof­
fee, cocoa, and rubber are expected to benefit more from ICAs through 
buffer stocking than is tea. Behrman estimated that the annual net 
revenue gains for tea will be modest (about $11 million) under a pure 
price-stabilization operation of the buffer stock. However, Behrman 
indicatedthatannualnetrevenuegainscanbesubstantial(above$1 
billion) if buffer stocks are operated to increase secular trends in 
real prices by two percent per annum, but suggests that such ICAs would 
be under great strain due to the difficulties of such oligopolistic 
market operations and opposition from consuming countries (12, p. 256;
_8, pp. 50-51).
The ultimate gain from the ITA would depend on the extent of pro­
ducer cohesion forged out in international forums. The consuming na­
tions have not responded much and are not likely to respond very enthu­
siastically in the light of experiences with: sugar, cocoa, and coffee, 
where they felt that producers did not do enough to hold down the price
line.when prices went sky-high...The.TNCs--packers and.blenders— are ■
"likely^to resist raising of export unit values through ICAs or value- 
added tea exports , and the General Foods-Brazilian government showdown
-108“
over soluble coffee—  in 1970 may yet recur in the case of tea. But, 
unless XDC producers toe the line, each may expand the market for 
short-term gains and the long-term results could be disastrous for 
all (29, pp. 32-33).
1/
1/ In the 1960s, Brazil expanded her soluble coffee manufacturing 
capacity significantly and, with the advantages of cheaper processing 
and fiscal incentives, was able to increase soluble coffee exports to 
the TJ.S. from 33,000 pounds in 1964 to 39 million pounds in 1972. Gen­
eral Foods, the largest U.S. roaster, protested against this loss of 
the domestic market and the U.S. brought pressure on Brazil to stop 
this, despite the fact that it did not violate the ICA. The Brazilian 
government had to yield and agreed to a "soluble coffee agreement" in 
1971 which made Brazilian coffee lose its advantage (30, pp• 39-53).
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CHAPTER V. INDIAN TEA: A STRATEGY FOR REVIVAL
PROBLEM AREAS AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
The major problems confronting Indian tea in the 1980s are:
©declining export earnings caused by loss of competi­
tiveness due to high cost of production;
©declining export availability due to growth rate of 
production compared to domestic consumption: and
©lack of investments in tea due to a low level of 
profitability.
The problems are exacerbated by a communication gap between the 
industry and the government and have to be visualized against the back- 
drop of a world market with relatively stagnant demand and a declining 
real price level. The world market trends also seem very unlikely to 
change radically.
Under the circumstances, a World Bank study found expansion of the 
Indian tea plantations to be "uneconomic" and suggested that India could 
benefit substantially by diversification and restriction of tea output 
(1j P • 73). On the other hand, Indian economists, the government, and 
the industry suggest "rationalization" to improve productivity and reduce 
unit costs backed by the long term strategy of demand promotion (2_, pp. 
175-194; 3, pp. 147-154; 4, pp. 115-121; 5_, pp. 23-28).
A Strategy of Diversification
A strategy of restriction and diversification, however, does not 
appear to be acceptable to Indian planners for several reasons.
First, in several regions, because of the high soil acidity, alter- 
nat ive cr oppossibilit .ies are poor and the oppo rtunity cost of the land 
may be very low.
Second, even where it is feasible to replace tea with another crop, 
rice appears to be the major alternative, and the export earning possi­
bilities of even low-yielding tea at depressed world prices are better 
than the export earning or import substitution capabilities of rice as 
an.alternate.crop.(6,.p..31)...............................................
Third, the scope for labor absorption is much higher in tea. The 
average annual labor input into tea in India over 1968-72 had been 703 
man-days (Appendix Table V) as against an average labor input of 94 man- 
days per cropped hectare for all crops in 1970-72 (7, p. 50) and an
average.input of 195 man-days per tr iple-cropped hectare over 1970-72...
(8, p. 57).
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Fourth, the employment provided by tea is more evenly distributed 
throughout the year due to a 8-12 month harvesting season.
Finally, the net returns per hectare were much higher for tea than 
for alternative crops. In 1975-76, the net returns per hectare were 
Rs 5000 for tea in Assam and Tamilnadu compared to only Rs 1000 for 
rice (9^ pp. 76-80).
Besides, the idea of restricting exports to raise export prices 
cannot be put into effect uninationally, as other exporters may quickly 
expand their market shares to fill the gap. This has happened in the 
world coffee economy with Brazil and may happen here if India attempts 
it. Export restrictions could only work under an effective ITA and the 
difficulties of reaching an effective ITA are well-known.
A Strategy of Rationalization
Since diversification and restriction of output as a policy measure 
would not be acceptable to Indian policy planners, the only need is for 
a policy of "rationalization." Such a policy would involve optimum 
factor utilization and technological improvements leading to maximiza­
tion of land and labor productivity and would simultaneously improve 
export availability and reduce unit costs. This would have to be backed 
up by demand promotion measures and improvement of the distribution 
system. The policy would also involve a reshaping of the land policy 
to make available land needed for expansion, provision of fiscal incen­
tives to encourage investments, and provision of export incentives. The 
need is for a concerted policy in all these spheres so that the differ­
ent policy instruments act in harmony (2_, pp. 175-176).
Technological improvements comprise divisible and indivisible inno­
vations. The major "divisible" innovations— fertilization, close plant­
ing, pest and disease control, pruning and superior varieties— have pro­
vided the major yield gains from the 1950s and constitute the major 
source of future increases in tea production. Indivisible innovations 
are "lumpy" and include irrigation provisions, renovation of factories, 
and mechanization to displace labor.
While other indivisible innovations have a positive role to play, 
the role of mechanization as a labor-saving device in a labor-surplus 
economy is of doubtful value and is likely to be resisted by the union­
ized labor. Since harvesting is the most labor-intensive and the most 
expensive of all operations, Eden suggested mechanized harvesting as 
in USSR and Japan to reduce costs (10, pp. 66-68). The unacceptability 
of large-scale labor displacement and the reduced quality of tea due 
to mechanical plucking appears to rule this out (2^  pp. 179-182).
ELEMENTS OF A POLICY FOR RATIONALIZATION 
Role of Technological Developments
The most significant yield-gains have been achieved by and will 
continue to be achieved by improved planting varieties, fertilization,
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infilling, weed control, pest control, pruning, drainage and irriga­
tion.
Improved Planting Materials. The major thrust for an improvement 
in productivity will come from planting with superior high-yielding, 
vegetatively propagated planting materials or "clones" which have been 
used in East Africa on a large scale. The theoretical yields of such 
clones with improved pruning cycles varies from region to region but 
the Tea Research Association (TRA) considers it technologically feasi­
ble to have yields of 3600 kilograms per hectare following the planting 
and pruning cycle (11, p. 21):
;ar Cultural Operation Yield
(kg./ha.)
1 Plant and center
2 Unprune 900
3 Unprune 1800
4 Unprune 2500
5 Prune 2250
6 Deep Skiff 2 700
7 Medium Skiff 3200
8 Prune 2900
9 Deep Skiff 3600
Thus, doubling the yields is possible with these clones. Some of 
the TRA clonal experiments of 1974-75 show the possibility of even higher 
yields. The yields obtained in the fourth year on some experiments were 
as follows (12, p. 56):
Dooars 4,566 kilograms per hectare
Terai 3,460 " " "
Cachar 3,315 " " "
Assam 3,000 " " "
Some of the clones already released by TRA and the scientific department 
of UPASI, with established yields, were (11, p. 23):
B/5/63 . ♦ . 3,021 kilograms per hectare
................................ 3/1/62.. . . 2,453.....”...... ”..... ".............................
B/4/142. . . 2,256
Even on a conservative estimate, yields of the order of 2,500 kilo­
grams per hectare are achievable (13^ , p. 16) and such yields are com­
parable with results in Kenya and Sri Lanka. New planting and replant- 
tingwith improved clones, thus, is the key too1 for yield maximization 
and unit cost reduction.
Infilling■ Planting denisty in older plantations varied from 7,000-
8,000 bushes per hectare. Eden concluded that it is possible to increase 
yields considerably by planting up to 18,000 bushes per hectare (10, pp.
.43-45) . .In.addition,.some.tea.bushes.do.not.survive.transplant at ion.,................
and it is possible to replace the dead bushes and plant up the vacant
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area by "infilling.11 The Lamond Coinmittee of the ITA estimated such 
"vacancies" to be of the order of ten percent and estimated that it 
was possible to enhance yields by ten percent by infilling at an 
expense of Rs 200 million over ten years (11, p. 29).
Pruning. The TRA experimental results, now adopted fairly widely, 
proved that adoption of three-year pruning cycles increased crop yields 
considerably. Remarkable yield gains have also been achieved by early 
pruning of young tea (13, p. 57) with different clones:
New Clearing, 
5th Year
Pruned Field. 
4th Year
(kg./ha.) (kg./ha.)
B/5/63 2,960 5,600
B/6/61 2,055 4,600
B/6/62 2,050 4,200
The Lamond Committee estimated that it was possible to enhance 
yields at least by 7-8 percent by simply altering the pruning cycle
(11, P. 32).
Fertilization. Standard dosages of fertilization included 35-55 
kilograms per hectare of straight nitrogen and 45-100 kilograms per 
hectare in a 1:2:2 N-P-K mixture and had been regularly used by tea 
plantations. It was discovered recently that much of the tea land was 
potash-deficient and had to be given extra doses of K to ensure absorp­
tion of N. Also, zinc deficiency was found to be important and needed 
to be corrected by zinc sulphate sprays. Better methods of fertiliza­
tion have also been established and all these are capable of signifi­
cantly boosting yields (14, pp. 47-48).
Weed Control. The ideas of weed control have undergone serious 
changes and, instead of the old practice of clean weeding, it is recom­
mended to weed out only grasses, leaving dicotyledon weeds. The older 
practice of manual weeding has been proposed to be replaced by applica­
tion of chemical weedicides which avoids root injury. Effective weed 
suppression is expected to cause at least a ten percent saving of the 
crop (15, p . 2).
Pest and Disease Control. While pests and diseases are relatively 
less damaging for tea than for other plantation crops, the major dis- 
eases--blister blight, red rust and black rot— and pests— thrips and 
mites— have caused some damage. Improved plant protection measures 
and some chemical pesticides which are compatible with biological con­
trol may further reduce damage and save about ten percent of the crop 
(14, p. 48; 11, pp. 30-33).
Drainage and Irrigation. The beneficial effects of irrigation on 
the tea plant, particularly during summer drought, are well-established 
(10, pp. 109-110). It has generally been held that irrigation and drain­
age can improve yields by 15 percent, and at least 60 percent of the tea
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area has irrigation potential (15, p. 2). In particular, sprinkler 
irrigation has been found to be beneficial to tea, but the lumpiness of 
irrigation investments has not allowed tea estates to go in for irri­
gation in a big way. A seminar organized by the Indian Institute of 
Foreign Trade recommended that the government should provide irriga­
tion for tea as for other crops, but no such action has been taken (16, 
pp. 50-51). ~~~
Processing. The major innovations in processing have been the 
switch ever from the orthodox processing method to the CTC/Rotorvane 
method and the introduction of continuous processing. Further R&D 
work on processing and packaging is going on and may yield substantial 
benefits in the future (14, p. 49).
The Key Role of Replanting
Of all the technological innovations cited above, replanting with 
improved material plays a key role. Tea is a wasting asset and tea 
bushes have an economic life of 50 years. A uniform replanting policy 
should envisage replanting of two percent of the bushes each year. Unless 
the uneconomic bushes can be replaced, fertilization, pest control or 
pruning cannot give sustained yield gains, and the yields of old bushes 
drop to low levels around 300-600 kilograms per hectare (11, pp. 15-17). 
Thus, replanting is the key tool of the rationalization policy.
Against an optimum replanting rate of two percent per annum, actual 
replantation in India over the period 1951-77 stood at an average rate 
of 0,6 percent per annum (Appendix Table XXII). The proportion of uneco­
nomic tea bushes in India has, therefore, been significant and rising.
The Tea Finance Committee estimated 21 percent of the bushes to be 
above 60 years old on March 31, 1963 (17, pp. 20-21) and the Tea Board 
estimated 38 percent of the bushes to be above 50 years old by 1976 (18, 
pp. 22-23). At the current rates of replanting and extension, this 
would reach 48 percent by 2000 and tea yields might start dropping.
Over 1950-80, yield gains were made despite suboptimalreplantat ion due 
to improved planting materials and improved practices, but this would 
not be possible over 1980-2000 in view of the much larger percentage of 
uneconomic bushes.
By t h e y e a r 2000,o n l y 123,000hectaresplantedafter1950will 
be of an economic age-group. The remaining 243,000 hectares should be 
replanted over 1980-2000— a replanting rate of 3.3 percent. Given the 
current status of replanting, is such a rate at all attainable?
How to Overcome the Obstacles to Replanting?
The maj or policy instrument intended to induce replantations in 
India has been the replantation subsidy. The subsidy scheme was intro- 
duced to induce replantation Investments in 1968-69. The initial level 
of the subsidy was Rs 3000 per hectare in the plains and Rs 4000 per 
hectare in the hills— later amended to Rs 4000 and Rs 5000, respectively. 
In spite of the subsidy, however, very little replanting was done.
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The broad and obvious conclusion was that the benefits of replant­
ing even with the subsidy were not commensurate with the costs, after 
taking into account the price of the old crop foregone. A World Bank 
study (6^ , Annex II) found that, over a ten-year period, the cost of 
replanting per hectare was Rs 42,310, income from replanting per hec­
tare was Rs 34,730,and value of the old crop foregone was Rs 3,441—  
causing a net loss of about Rs 11,000 per hectare, which the subsidy of 
Rs 4,000 could not counterbalance. World Bank studies showed that bene­
fits exceeded costs only after 17 years, and discounting of cash flows 
made it a better choice for the planter not to replant.
While current high clonal yields make the economics a little more 
attractive, the same general conclusion still holds. The economics 
can be made favorable for replanting by increasing the subsidy level, 
but even this may not induce the planters to invest about Rs 12,500 per 
hectare when the profitability of tea investments is low. Given current 
levels of production costs and prices, the profitability can be enhanced 
only by reducing the taxation. Logically, too, high taxation rates and 
high subsidy rates seem incompatible. The current level of taxation of 
gross income on tea is 67 percent compared to 58 percent for other indus­
tries due to the high level of Agricultural Income Tax incidence. The 
Tea Finance Committee had recommended that Agricultural Income Tax rates 
should not exceed corporate Income Tax rates (17, pp. 32-33), but no 
action was taken and state Agricultural Income Tax rates were enhanced 
steadily thereafter.
A reduction of taxation levels from 67 percent to 55 percent can 
make replanting economical and eliminate the need for subsidies.!/ It 
would, however, be necessary to devise a mechanism to ensure that the 
funds released by taxation actually go into investments. A tax rebate, 
contingent upon fulfilling the replantation target, may achieve this.
A meaningful discussion between the center and the state governments 
is called for to decide the mechanism of the rebate and each govern­
ment's share and also to ensure that no further escalation of agricul­
tural income tax rates takes place.
A fiscal incentive, thus, would be the key instrument used to induce 
replanting.
Rational Target-Setting and Cost Benefits
In the past, the government talked glibly of production and export 
for the tea industry. The Tea Board set a production target of 750,000 
MT for 1985 (4, p. 120) and 1.3 million MT for 2000 (18, p. 41). The 
Ministry then revised the target for the year 2000 to 1.4 million MT and 
the export target for 2000 to 40 percent of the world market (18, pp. 41— 
42).
If In an unpublished paper by the author, it was established by cost- 
benefit analysis that replantation at the desired rate of 3.3 percent could 
be made financially viable for an "average" estate with an additional sub­
sidy of Rs 3,100 per hectare or with a tax reduction to 61.3 percent. Tax 
reduction was a much stronger tool to induce investments since it improved 
profitability . For different regions, however, the conditions differed. 
South Indian estates were the worst off, due to size disadvantages, and 
required tax reduction to 55 percent to make replanting viable without 
subsidies.
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The current production trends fall far short of these unrealistic 
targets , and production is only projected to reach 792,000 MT by 200.0 
at current rates of replantation and extension (Chapter III). With 
projected consumption for 2000 at 729,000 MT, even to enhance export 
availability a little beyond the current level of 200,000 MT would imply 
a target of one million MT.
How feasible is the target of one million tons and what are its 
implications?
Of the 366,000 hectares of tea in 1980, 243,000 hectares need replan­
tation by 2000. Assuming that 2,500-kilograms-per-hectare yields would 
be reached by replantation from the ninth year onward, the replanted area 
could yield about 404,000 MT by 2000.
The remaining 123,000 hectares of economic bushes currently yield 
about 1,500 kilograms per hectare (1980). The Lamond Committee esti­
mated the following production gains due to technological innovations in 
North-East India (11, p. 32):
COST PRODUCTION GAIN.:
(in 10 years) (from 10th year)
Infilling Rs 178 ,4 million 33,000 MT
Drainage Rs 46 7 20,500 MT
Pruning — M 23,500 MT
Weed control Rs 75 0 43,000 MT
Manuring Rs 26 3 39,000 MT
Pest control Rs 19 6 32,000 MT
Rs 346 M 191,000 MT
It has been suggested that these estimates are unduly optimistic, but 
that improvements within 50 percent of these are attainable (11, p. 31). 
This would be consistent with the yield gains of 2.5 percent achieved 
o v e r 1948-78andwouldimplyaproductionof275,000M T f r o m 123,000 
hectares at a total cost of about Rs 380 million.
The production from the entire existing tea area would, thus, be 
about 679,000 MT by 2000— the remaining 321,000 MT would have to be met 
byextensionson landadjacenttoteaareasand expansionsin new areas. 
According to the National Commission on Agriculture, about 85,000 hec­
tares of land was available for extension in the tea estates in 1972-73 
(5^  p. 26). Extension on this land can produce 159,000 MT by 2000 at 
an extension rate of 1.2 percent per annum. The remaining 162,000 MT 
can be produced by expansion in new areas on 86,000 hectares.
Land.and.Credit.Po.l icy.:.........................■'........................
The target of one million MT by 2000 is attainable, but implies 
availability of land and capital. Land availability in the new areas 
to the extent of 86,000 hectares is not seriously questioned, but the
.land.policy.of.the.traditional.tea.producing.states.will.have.to.be...
changed so that the land for extension is made available for tea pro­
duction and not put to other usage under pressure of land reforms. It
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should also be considered whether the tea expansion should be through 
estates or smallholders.
The capital needs would be very large and may be computed as fol­
lows. Replantation of 243,000 hectares at Rs 12,500 per hectare (cost 
for first five years) (6_, Annex II) would involve Rs 3 billion. Exten­
sion and expansion of 171,000 hectares at Rs 9,900 per hectare (cost 
for first four years) OS, Annex II) would involve Rs. 1.7 billion. Tech­
nical improvement of the existing crop of 123,000 hectares would involve 
Rs 400 million. The capital needs for plantations add up to Rs 5.1 bil­
lion against the CCPA estimate of Rs 5.3 billion (19, p. 39). The CCPA 
also estimated Rs 4.7 billion to be the supporting investment needed for 
construction of factories, houses, roads, renovation of factories, etc., 
bringing the total capital need to Rs 10 billion. This compares well 
with an estimate of the ITA of Rs 16.8 billion to reach an output of 1.4 
million MT by the year 2000 (18, p. 19).
The capital needs of the industry thus amount to Rs 500 million 
annually. As against this, the industry's net profit in a moderately 
good year (1974-75) was Rs 118 million of which Rs 86 million were 
retained for plowback (20, p. 2121). At 1980 real cost price structure 
and with the proposed tax cut, this could rise to Rs 125 million annually, 
leaving a credit need of Rs 375 million to be met by the government and 
the banks. The government's major loan schemes— the Plantation Finance 
scheme, Tea Machinery and Irrigation hire-purchase scheme and Irrigation 
Loan scheme— have altogether a revolving fund of Rs 100 million with 
average annual disbursements over 1975-77 of only Rs 11 million (20, 
p. 2121), The credit needs of the industry would have to be met and the 
Tea Board would have to centrally monitor the long-term credit flows 
from banks and from its own funds. With a 10-year repayment period, a 
total fund of Rs. 3.75 billion would be required to meet the long-term 
credit needs.
Rationalization of the Tax Base
Apart from the income tax reduction, a rationalization and simpli­
fication of the tax base has been proposed. This has essentially two 
components— taxation at a single point and remodeling the levy of excise 
duty on an ah valorem basis.
The many forms and levels of taxation on tea (Table 5) have often 
been pointed out by the industry as worthy of rectification. Collection 
of all the levies at one point, preferably the auction/sales (if outside 
an auction) point can ease the accounting and cash flow problems of the 
industry.
The levy of excise duty at a flat rate per kilogram within each 
zone can be inequitous, as prices fetched by different tea estates within 
a zone vary sharply (3_, p. 79). The impact of excise duty on prices 
also varies widely from zone to zone. Over 1975-77, excise duties have
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1 1 " ' es of Calcutta auction prices of the zone as follows
At 1980 prices, excise duty incidence is, on an average, 7.5 percent. 
Reorganization of the excise duty system on such an ad_ valorem basis 
would be more "just" and would give a relief to small estates for whom 
the present mode of taxation is regressive.
A Shift to a Smallholder Policy
A major impact on the cost of production could be made by a shift 
to a smallholder-oriented production policy. It is not suggested that 
existing estates be chopped up into small units but the entire extension 
and expansion in new areas could be through smallholder projects rather 
than estates. Tamilnadu and West Bengal state governments are paying 
serious attention to this, but this needs to be taken up on a concerted 
basis at the national level.
The KTDA experience has proven that it is possible to grow tea on 
a large scale through smallholders and ensure high yields and quality 
products. It would be necessary to set up an extension agency and pro­
vide institutional arrangements to provide inputs and credit, collect 
tea leaves, and arrange processing and marketing. The beginnings of the 
project would have to be slow in view of the intense supervision and 
training needs but, over an intermediate term (20 years), this policy 
would give dividends. Most state governments do have plantation cor­
porations already. They have well-developed marketing channels and 
could provide the institutional backing needed for smallholders1 coop­
eratives. The KTDA experience also illustrates that the administrative
costs of the institution.are relatively small compared to the.cost s.of..
setting up the infrastructure which would be needed even for an estate 
mode of production. Savings in cost of production may be considerable 
and, politically, a smallholder project is far more acceptable to most 
state governments and may resolve the conflict between land reforms and 
tealandneeds.Suchashiftwouldimplythatone-thirdoftheIndian 
tea area would be under smallholders* by 2000 as against 2 percent in 
1980 and, on the present estimates of 40 percent of estate costs being 
labor costs, could reduce average cost of production by 13 percent and 
enhance Indian tea's competitive position.
Problems with Nonviable Estates
Nonviable and sick estates already present a major problem to the 
industry. By 1976, 38 tea estates had fallen "sick" and closed down 
(22, p. 784). Most of these were small (less than 100 hectares), pro­
prietary estates squeezed out by the diseconomies of scale. A study
2/ Zones represent administrative jurisdictions of the Central 
Excise Department, within which excise duty is fixed at a flat rate per 
kilogram.
Zone I 
Zone II 
Zone III 
Zone IV
3.7 percent 
5.3 percent
7.8 percent 
10.4 percent
/
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by the National Council of Applied Economic Research also found them 
to be badly managed, short of capital, highly indebted and with old 
machinery (23, p. 380).
The rationalization policy with large capital investment will pay 
off in large estates due to the economies of scale. The smallholder 
sector, with state support, can thrive on the new areas. It appears 
that the small estates are caught in between with an outmoded estate 
production process but on a scale too small for the estate system to 
work properly. The response of the government has been to take over 
the management of "sick" tea estates which incurred loss for three out 
of five years, had yields at least 25 percent less than the averageT 
and were habitual defaulters on statutory obligations (22, p. 784).
Such taken-over estates, however, did not in general attain viability 
but merely transferred the losses to the public coffers. The logical 
step for such small estates would be to either amalgamate with others 
into a larger, viable estate or to be split up into smallholdings to 
be operated by the estate workers.
Amalgamation has long been recommended (2^, p. 185) but little has 
been achieved on the ground. Amalgamation of units may proceed quicker 
after government takeover of units, but splitting up estates may present 
organizational problems and it is suspected that this will continue to 
be a problem area. Fortunately, the magnitude of the problem is not 
large, as less than six ^percent of tea land is under estates below 100 
hectares.
BACKUP POLICY OF DISTRIBUTION AND TRADE 
Reform of the Auction and Distribution System
The auction system has often been blamed as the villain respon­
sible for low prices (24, pp. 146-150). Restructuring of the auction 
system has been suggested, but, given the concentration of buying and 
selling powers in the hands of a few big blenders, restructuring of 
auctions cannot change things much (25, P. 827). The alternatives to 
auctions as the primary marketing system are not clear. Direct ex­
garden sales fetch lower prices, monopoly state marketing boards appear 
to be inefficient, and futures markets are strongly susceptible to specu­
lation. The Tandon Committee, appointed by the Government of India to 
look into this, found auctions to be a fair system of disposal on the 
whole and no immediate change seemed called for.
To relieve concentration in the distribution system, the Tea Trad­
ing Corporation of India (TTCI) has emerged as a buyer in the domestic 
auctions and a seller of packaged tea in the international market. With 
greater emphasis on export of value-added tea from producing countries, 
concentration in the world market is expected to decline. The large 
packers and blenders, however, are resisting this and it has been sug­
gested that the LDCs set up a large packing/blending company to compete 
with the TNCs (26, p. 18). This is expected to be a slow process and 
only an ITA can provide the institutional framework for encouraging 
value-added tea exports.
-121-
Need for a Steady Export Policy
The industry has always suffered from uncertainties regarding the 
export policy, with the export duty being imposed on and off for the last 
30 years. The export duty was abolished in 1979, but the industry needs 
some reassurance that it will not be reimposed. In view of the need for 
export earnings and the declining competitiveness of Indian tea due to 
heavy tax incidence, the present policy may be continued as a stable 
export policy (18, pp. 12-15). If the rationalization policy is pursued 
properly, domestic consumption is not expected to be restricted and 
exports can still pick up somewhat.
Export promotion measures in the shape of import facilities, cash 
incentives, and excise duty refunds have encouraged exports of value- 
added items in the 1970s and will continue to do so. Expansion of value- 
added exports to developed countries is expected to be slow. A phased 
approach might work— concentrating first on the Middle East market where 
there is little competition and then proceeding to developed countries 
in collaboration with the blenders there. Since labor is cheaper in 
India than in developed countries, it may be possible to work out an 
arrangement to the mutual benefit of blenders and Indian national inter- 
ests (26, p. 3).
Need for Promotion
The Indian government traditionally spent considerably less on pro­
motion than their Sri Lankan counterpart (6^, pp. 37-38). During 1953-60, 
there was no organized promotion drive in foreign markets, but overseas 
promotion gained importance in the 1960s. The 1978 promotion budget of 
Rs 15 million was probably inadequate, and an amount of Rs 60 million 
would be required on the yardstick of two percent of export earnings 
(27, p. 24). Most of the promotional work through Tea Centers in foreign 
cities has been found to be of limited utility, and future promotion 
should proceed more in line with commercial interests and through pro­
fessionals (18, p . 233)   Uninational promotion may effectively follow
introduction of national brands in markets, while broad support of ge­
neric promotion through the ITPA would be more relevant in the Western 
markets.
Support f o r the ITA........................................................
The maj or international issue of forcing a higher "real" price of 
tea can only be resolved through an international arrangement such as 
the ITA. The Indian government, therefore, should continue its support 
of the ITA. A flexible approach during negotiations is called for regard­
ing quota fixation, as it is extremely unlikely that India can maintain 
her current itiarket share. Even under the plan advocated here, Indian 
exports by the year 2000 can only be cn the order of 250,000 MT— only 16 
percent of the world market.
WHAT THE EUTURE HOLDS FOR INDIAN TEA
The package of policy measures advocated here involves fiscal incen­
tives and a liberalized credit policy to induce investments for replanta­
tion of the entire aged tea-bush population with clonal varieties backed
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up by other technical improvements} a large-scale shift to smallholder 
tea production under state involvement, a stable export policy, effec­
tive demand promotion^ and an International Tea Agreement. The steps 
can yield a production of one million tons by the year 2000 but would 
involve a heavy investment of Rs 10 billion.
The investment of Rs 10 billion, however, generates an additional 
crop of 450,000 tons by 2000— valued at Rs 5.4 billion at 1980 prices. 
The capital-output ratio of 1.9:1 is much higher than the average rate 
of 6.2:1 for all industrial investments (28, p. 174). Further, the 
horizontal expansion envisaged would provide 364,000 direct jobs and, 
perhaps, 500,000 jobs in all, including processing and trade (15, p. 2). 
The tax rebate would cost the government Rs 40 million annually in the 
early 1980s, but the added crop could bring in an extra Rs 400 million 
annually as excise duty and total government revenue gain could be above 
Rs 700 million per year (19, p. 40). The plan should also ensure annual 
export revenues above $500 million in real 1980 terms, if the ITA is 
able to defend a real price-line.
The investment, then, seems worthwhile. The task, however, is 
extremely difficult. To pump finances at eight times the rate of the 
1970s, to replant at five times the rate of 1950-77 and to expand at 
four times the rate of 1950-77 with a shift to the smallholder mode of 
production, all imply a task imposingly difficult. But time is of the 
essence. At current trends of replantation, the earning capacity of 
the estates is depreciating rapidly. By 2000, unless the current trends 
are reversed, the required rate of replantation would be above four per­
cent* the capital needs and the complexity of the task would increase 
several-fold and more estates would be sick or abandoned.
The time to act is now! Rehabilitation of the tea sector is an 
important task and one that deserves the attention of both the govern­
ment and- the industry. The sector cannot, perhaps, return to the pre­
eminent position it had in the Indian economy before 1950, but it can 
still be nursed back to health, and its continued good health is of 
importance to the government, the industry, and the people of the tea 
growing areas.
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APPENDIX TABLE I. INDIA: CONTRIBUTION OF TEA TO THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY
Gross Value of Export Direct Consumer
Tea Produced Earnings Tax Revenue Price
Year In India From Tea From Tea Index No.
(million Rs) (million Rs) (million Rs) (1950=100)
1950 1 ,120. 2 804.2 135.6 100
1951 1,298.8 939.4 146.0 104
1952 1,087.1 808.8 145.1 102
1953 1,298.7 1 ,020.6 140,8 105
1954 2,015 .3 1,482.5 137.1 101
1955 1,635.1 1,096.4 229.3 95
1956 1,824.9 1,451.3 210.0 104
1957 1,659.0 1,136.4 236.6 109
1958 1,788.0 1,297.0 229.5 115
1959 1,847.7 1,290.8 209.8 119
1960 1,880.4 1,222.5 206.5 122
1961 1,946.2 1,221.7 193.7 124
1962 1,958.5 1,296.0 206.1 128
1963 1,954.3 1,231.9 202.5 132
1964 2,076.7 1,246.7 158.0 150
1965 2,071.1 1,148.4 171.7 164
1966 2,612.7 1,562.2 170.1 182
1967 2,901.4 1,802.0 471.6 205
1968 2,724.7 1,565.1 531.0 204
1969 2,535.5 1,245.0 461.9 199
1970 2,919.4 1,482.5 310.3 210
1971 3,110.8 1,609.2 375.6 216
1972 3,191.4 1,472.9 343.5 2 31
1973 3,368.0 1,448.5 296.1 269
1974 4,890.2 2,235.4 303.0 346
1975 5,344.2 2,382.9 400.6 365
1976 6,277.0 2,952.6 566.2 338
1977 10,790.4 5,637.2 578.4 365
1978 8,409.6 3,285.6 1,603.6 405
Sources: J. Thomas & Co., Tea Statistics 1978-79, pp. 2-3; Tea
Bo ard , Tea Statistics (various issues); United Nations, Statistical Year'
book (various issues).
APPENDIX TABLE II. INDIA: NUMBER OF TEA ESTATES, AREA UNDER
TEA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF TEA, 1900-79
Number of 
Production 
Units
Area
Under
Tea Production Yield
(hectares) (metric tons) (kg./ha.
1900 - 211,443 89,567 424
1910 4,402 228,062 119,569 524
1920 5,054 284,922 156,645 550
1930 4,743 325,057 177,391 546
1940 6,564 337,296 210,415 624
1950 6,731 314,640 275,475 876
1960 9,499 331,229 321,077 969
1970 12,015 356,516 435,468 1,174
1979 13,229 366,000* 550,000* 1,503*
Source: J. Thomas & Co., Tea Statistics 1978-79, pp. 1-3; FAO,
Production Yearbook, 1979.
* FAO estimates.
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APPENDIX TABLE V. TRENDS IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
IN INDIAN TEA PLANTATIONS 1931-77
Area Under 
Tea
Average
Labor
Employed
Labor
Per
Hectare
Yield
Per
Hectare
Yield Per 
Yield Per 
Laborer
(ha.) (persons) (kg.) (kg./capita)
1951 316,870 1,017,989 3.21 901 280
1952 317,916 1,054,295 3.32 877: 264
195 3 318,642 1,054,102 3.31 875 264
1954 319,478 1,085,191 3.40 925 272
1955 320,238 1,017,483 3.18 961 302
1956 320,588 1,004,683 3.13 963 307
1957 323,285 1,004,257 3.11 961 309
1958 325,357 980,238 3.01 1 ,000 332
1959 326,494 919,405 2.82 998 355
1960 330,738 845,166 2.55 971 380
1961 331,229 822,834 2.48 1,070 431
1962 332,524 816,262 2.45 1,043 425
196 3 334,036 847,372 2.54 1,037 409
1964 337,874 818,783 2.42 1 , 1 0 2 455
1965 341,762 807,169 2.36 1,072 454
1966 345,256 804,135 2.33 1,089 467
1967 347,653 775,184 2.23 1,107 495
1968 351,065 755,729 2.15 1,146 533
1969 353,359 747,835 2 . 1 2 1,114 526
19 70 354,133 759,646 2.14 1,182 552
1971 356,516 766,593 2.15 1 , 2 2 1 568
1972 358,675 761,919 2 . 1 2 1,271 600
1973 360,108 766,036 2.13 1,311 615
19 74 361,663 771,717 2.13 1,353 6 35
1975 363,303 774,897 2.13 1,341 629
19 76 364,275 776,162 2.13 1,405 659
19 77 366,276 780,160 2.13 1,525 716
Source: Tea Board of India, Tea Statistics, (computed from
various issues).
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APPENDIX TABLE VI. INDIA: PROFITABILITY INDICES FOR TEA
PLANTATIONS, 1939-76
(percent)
Year
Gross 
Profit 
to Sales 
Ratio
Net Profit 
to Net 
Worth 
Ratio
Tax Provision 
to Profits 
Before Tax 
Rat io
Retained Profit 
t o Pro f it s 
After Tax 
. Ratio
Current 
Asset to 
Liability 
Ratio
1939 17.8 8.3 24.1 47.4
1946 31.0 14.0 38.3 46.9 -
1950 41.5 16.8 41.5 55.0 -
1951 17.2 8.6 - - -
1952 2.6 - - - -
1953 35.0 21.5 - - -
1954 48.9 30.6 36.8 65.7 1.42
1955 15.3 5.4
1956 23.6 1 1 . 2
1957 1 2 .0 3.8 49.9 7.3
1958 15.2 6.0
1959 20.6 10.3
1960-61 2 0 .1 9.2 46.5 19.7 1.42
1961-62 14.5 5.9 51.8 3.3 1.38
1962-63 16.7 6 . 1 61.4 11.4 1.30
1963-64 12.9 4.9 56.0 4.2 1.26
1964-65 14.5 5.6 53.8 9.6 1 .2 2
1965-66 13.3 5.2 60.0 4.7 1.18
1966-67 16.2 6.9 53.4 4.7 1 .2 0
1967-68 16.1 7.9 57.0 8.3 1 . 2 1
1968-69 8.6 3.9 62.6 -18.3 1.15
1969-70 7.6 4.3 66.0 -28.4 1.17
1970-71 10.2 9.8 51.2 17.8 1 . 2 1
1971-72 8.2 7.7 55.1 9.4 1 . 2 1
1972-73 7.7 6.3 61.3 7.1 1.17
1973-74 8.4 8.7 50.4 42.7 1.19
1974-75 14.6 16.3 57.0 73.4 1.23
1975-76 10.5 13.0 56.0 58.2 1.25
Sources: Government of India, Report of the Plantation Inquiry Commis­
sion, Appendix LXXXIV. Tea Board, Tea Statistics 1961-63, pp. 85-88. Tea 
............Board-,.Tea Statistics I 977—78,.pp..123-129... ..............................
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APPENDIX TABLE VII. PRICE VARIATIONS FOR TEA IN DOMESTIC 
AND LONDON AUCTIONS, 1950-78
Average Domestic Average London
_____ Auction Price______  _____ Auction Price______
Year Nominal Real* Nominal Real*
(Rs/Kg) (pence/Kg)
1950 4.23 4.23 38.2 38.2
1951 3.74 3.67 34.5 28.8
1952 3.10 3.04 35.9 29.7
1953 4.26 4.06 44 .8 38.2
1954 6 . 1 2 6.06 63.0 55.0
1955 4.35 4.58 51.3 44.2
1956 4.94 4.75 54.5 45.3
1957 4.39 4.03 52.5 42.6
1958 4.55 3.96 49.7 40.8
1959 5.04 4.24 51.4 42.7
1960 5.28 4.33 53.0
1961 4.86 3.92 50.5 40.5
1962 5.26 4.11 50.4 40.9
1963 5.27 3.99 48.0 38.5
1964 5.18 3.45 48.5 38.5
1965 5.46 3.33 47.6 37.3
1966 5.66 3.11 46.2 35.4
1967 6.06 2.96 47.4 35.9
1968 5.75 2.82 41.2 31.6
1969 5.88 2.95 45.7 33.5
1970 6.55 3.12 43.1 29.7
1971 6.79 3.14 42.0 27.3
1972 6.54 2.83 44.8 26.9
1973 6.85 2.55 52.8 26.6
1974 10.04 2.90 63.0 25.9
1975 10.74 2.94 68.3 24.9
1976 12.34 3.65 148.7 53.4
1977 15.29 4.19 129.3 f 6
1978 12.65 3.05 109.8 37.9
*Domestic prices deflated to 1950 base through CPI and London prices
deflated to 1950 base through Index of LDC import unit values.
Source: J. Thomas & Co., Tea Statistics 1978-79
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APPENDIX TABLE VIII. INDIA: DIRECT TAX
REVENUE FROM TEA
Year Export Duty
Central Excise/ 
Tea Cess* Total
(in millions of rupees)
1949-50 109.9 25.7 135.6
1950-51 112.4 33.6 146.0
1951-52 102.0 43.1 145.1
1952-53 106.2 34.6 140.8
1953-54 116.2 20.9 137.1
1954-55 197.4 31.9 229.3
1955-56 178.3 3.1.7 210.0
1956-57 204.7 31.9 236.6
1957-58 190.9 38.6 229.5
1958-59 162.7 47.1 209.8
1959-60 122.7 83.8 206.5
1960-61 111.7 82.0 193.7
1961-62 98.3 107.8 206.1
1962-63 66.0 136.5 202.5
1963-64 — 158.0 158.0
1964-65 — 171.7 171.7
1965-66 — 170.1 170.1
1966-67 315.1 156.5 471.6
1967-68 282.8 248.2 531.0
1968-69 210.7 251.2 461.9
1969-70 78.6 231.7 310.3
1970-71 4.0 371.6 375.6
19/ l - / 2 ....... .......... 343.5.. ......... 343.5
1972-73 — 296.1 296.1
1973-74 — 303.0 303.0
1974-75 — 400.6 400.6
1975-76 — 566.2 566.2
r\ Q ~l C. 7  7 .............................. ........................................c 7  o..../................................ ..................................... c; 7  o ..../,±y / 0 ““ / / 3 / 0 . 4 - 3/0.4
1977-78 984.3 619.3 1,603.6
*Cess collections showed with export duty revenues till 1962-63 
and with excise revenues thereafter.
Source::TeaBoardofIndia!TeaStatistics. (variousIssues!
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APPENDIX TABLE IX. INDIA: CONSUMPTION OF TEA
Total
Apparent Consumption
Apparent
Per Capita Consumption
(1000 metric tons) (kilograms)
1951 72.8 0.20
1952 76.8 0 .2 1
1953 82.7 0.22
1954 78.9 0 .2 1
1955 100.5 0.26
1956 97.4 0.25
1957 112.5 0.28
1958 108.9 0.26
1959 109.1 0.26
1960 126.8 0.29
1961 139.6 0.32
1962 135.7 0.31
1963 140.7 0.31
1964 149.0 0.32
1965 166.0 0.35
1966 184.2 0.37
1967 179.5 0.36
1968 185.9 0.36
1969 203.3 0.37
1970 213.0 0.39
1971 224.7. 0.41
1972 236.9 0.42
1973 248.0 0.44
1974 260.0 0.45
1975 272.0 0.47
1976 286.0 0.48
1977 300.0 0.50
Source: Tea Board of India, computed from Tea Statistics 1977-
78_, p. 93.
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APPENDIX TABLE X. INDIA: TRENDS IN BEVERAGE
CONSUMPTION, 1960-70 
(Per Capita)
Year
Tea
(grams)
Coffee 
(grams)
Beer
(litre)
Milk
(kilograms)
Soft Drinks 
(litre)
1960-61 291 83 0.022 46.1 0.028
1961-62 314 113 0.024 45.3 0.044
1962-63 298 57 0.025 44.5 0.075
1963-64 301 74 0.026 43.7 0.125
1964-65 312 73 0.030 42.9 0.148
1965-66 339 72 0.035 42.1 0.175
1966-67 367 88 0.036 41.4 0.195
1967-68 351 76 0.037 40.6 0.216
1968-69 352 83 0.037 39.8 0.241
1969-70 418 83 0.037 39.1 0.269
Index no.
for 1969-70 144 100 168 85 961
(1960-61=
100)
Income-
elasticity 1.90 0.48 3.95 0.80 10.62
Source: Marketing Research Corporation of India, Survey of
India's Export Potential of Tea, pp, 97, 101, 102.
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APPENDIX TABLE XI. INDIA: TREND OF EXPORTS AND
EXPORT EARNINGS, 1950-78
Year Exports Export Earnings Unit Value
(1000 MT) (million Rs) (Rs/Kg)
1950 200.85 804.2 4.01
1951 194.7 939.4 4.83
1952 193.9 808.8 4.17
1953 213.5 1 ,020.6 4.78
1954 208.5 1,482.5 7.11
1955 183.8 1,096.4 5.97
1956 233.1 1,451.3 6.23
1957 191.8 1,136.4 5.93
1958 217.3 1,297.0 5.97
1959 215.5 1,290.8 5.99
1960 196.5 1,222.5 6.22
1961 205.3 1,221.7 5.95
1962 220.8 1,296.0 5.87
1963 209.3 1,231.9 5.89
1964 212.3 1,246.7 5.87
1965 197.4 1,148.4 5.82
1966 190.4 1,562.2 8 . 2 1
1967 203.3 1,802.0 8.86
1968 200.8 1,565.1 7.79
1969 174.1 1,245.0 7.15
1970 199.1 1,482.5 7.44
1971 214.3 1,609.2 7.51
1972 193.2 1,472.9 7.62
1973 190.3 1,448.5 7.61
1974 225.1 2,235.4 9.93
1975 211.4 2,382.9 11.27
1976 242.4 2,952.6 12.18
1977 221.5 5,637.2 25.45
1978 166.3 3,285.6 19.76
Source: J. Thomas & Co. , Tea Statistics 1978-79, pp. 2-3.
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APPENDIX TABLE XII. INDIA: PATTERN OF TEA EXPORTS
1938-39 1951 1961 1971 1977
(’000 M.T.)
W. Europe: 140.7 (89%) 145.7 (75%)130.9 (40%) 78.4 (40%) 90.8(40%)
U.K. 138.5 130.9 1 2 1 . 8 66.2 74.3
Eire 1.5 10.9 5.8 5.3 6.4
Others 0.7 3.9 3.3 6.9 1 0 . 1
E. Europe — (-) 2.5 (1 %) 13.0 (6%) 45.4 (23%) 59.2(26%)
U.S.S.R. — 2.3 11.9 39.6 47.7
Poland — 0.2 1 . 0 3.4 5.3
Others — — 0 . 1 2.4 6 .2
America: 1 0.8 (7%) 23.7 (1 2%) 17.9 (9%) 12.3 (6%) 12.6 (5%)
U.S. 3.7 1 2 . 1 1.0.9 8.5 1 0 .0
Canada 7.0 8.7 6.4 3.8 2.5
Others 0 . 1 2.9 0.6 — 0 . 1
Asia: 5.2 (3%) 14.6 (8%) 17.4 (8%) 32.2 (16%) 32.5(14%)
Afghanistan 1 . 2 1.5 3.5 14.9 8.6
Iran 3.4 5.0 3.5 3.2 6.5
Iraq — 0.3 2.4 6.4 4.6
Gulf States 0.3 3.0 1.5 3.3 5.8
Other W. Asia 0.3 3.3 5.1 3.4 1 . 1
Others — 1.5 1.4 1 . 0 5.9
Africa: 0.4n o (~) 3.5 (2%) 23.8 (1 2%) 23.5 (1 2%) 28.7(13%).. r,gypr.........
Sudan
...... u. z.......
0 . 1
.1 , b
1 . 2
......±/.z.
6.5
.......8.4.
12.4
......14.0.................
13.0
Others 0 . 1 0.7 0 . 1 2.7 1.7
Oceania: 0.7 (1%) 3.6 (2%) 3.2 (2%) 3.4 (2%) 5.9 (2%)
..Au s t r a 1 i a...........0 . 6....... 3.0 .......2.5........3.1........4.6.................
New Zealand 
Others
0 . 1
'vDO 
1 1
0.7 coO 
1 i
COi—i 
i i
World 158.6 193.6 206.2 195.2 229.6
.Source:— Tea Board of India, Tea Statistics— (various issues).
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(th ou sa n d  h e c t a r e s )
APPENDIX TABLE XIII. AREA UNDER CULTIVATION OF TEA IN
PRODUCING COUNTRIES: 193^-38 TO 1976-78
193U -38 1 9 ^ 8 -5 2 1 9 6 1 -6 5 1969- n 1 9 7 6 -7 8
ASIA: 905 889 1082 1170 1277
I n d ia 309 316 335 355 365
C hina . . . 87 187 2l*9 306
S r i  Lanka 226 229 239 2U2 2l+2
In d o n e s ia 2 0 h 139 13I* 109 103
Japan 39 28 1*9 52 60
Turkey - 3 17 27 53
B a n g la d esh 1*1* 30 35 1*2
Taiwan 1*5 35 37 36 3l*
Ir a n 3 10 22 27 27
O th ers 35 12 27 29 1*5
AFRICA: IT 36 78 121 179
Kenya 5 8 21 1*0 81*
M alawi T 9 13 16 18
O ther s 5 19 1*1* 65 77
EUROPE: 1*0 63 68 75 77
USSR 1*0 63 68 l k 77
O th ers - - - 1 -  .
SOUTH AMERICA: - 6 22 1*7 — 5 1
A rg e n t in a _ 2 16 36 1*0
O th ers - k 6 11 11
OCEANIA: - - - 1 5
WORLD TOTAL 962 9 9 k 1250 ll*ll* 1582
S o u r c e : FAO, P r o d u c t io n  Y ea rb ook .
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APPENDIX XIV. PRODUCTION OF TEA IN PRODUCING 
COUNTRIES: 193^-38 TO 1976-78
(th ou sa n d  m e tr ic  t o n s )
193^ -38 1 9 ^ 8 -5 2 1961-65 1969-71 1 9 7 6 -7 8
ASIA: 72l* 598 966 1123 ll*03
In d ia 178 273 357 1*16 550
China 270 60 158 220 313
S r i  Lanka 10U iko 217 215 201
Japan 1*9 ho 80 91 102
Turkey - - 9 31* 77
In d o n e s ia 75 39 75 65 66
B an gladesh 2 6 22 26 25 36
Taiwan 11 10 20 26 26
Ira n 1 5 12 18 22
O th ers 10 9 12 13 10
AFRICA: 8 19 60 117 177
Kenya 1* 6 17 38 8 l
M alawi b 7 13 18 31
O thers - 6 30 6 l 65
EUROPE: 5 21 1*5 65 100
USSR 5 21 1*5 65 100
O thers -
SOUTH AMERICA: - 1 lU 31* 1*1*
A rg e n tin a 10 26 32
Other s — 1 l* ...............8........ ............ 1 2 ...................................
OCEANIA: - 1 1 1 6
WORLD TOTAL T38 61*0 1085 13l*l 1730
-Source:__FAQ, Produetaon Yearbook
(th ou sa n d  m e t r ic  t o n s )
APPENDIX TABLE XV. TEA EXPORTS: 1931-38 TO 1976-78
1931-38  1918-52  1961-65 1969-71 1976-78
ASIA: 3 9 6 .0 U 07-9 5 0 7 .8 538 .7 589.1
I n d ia 15U.7 1 9 3 .5 2 0 7 .1 189 .5 212 .1
S r i  Lanka 99.6 1 3 7 . 1* 2 1 0 .3 2 05 .8 1 92 .8
China 1 0 .0 1 1 .8 3 0 .9 3 1 .3 6 1 .7
In d o n e s ia 6 J . 6 2 6 .0 3 0 .8 1 0 .6 5 1 .7
B an gladesh - 1 3 .2 . 2 .0 2 2 .0 2 6 .8
Taiw an 1 0 .5 8 .9 1 5 .2 2 1 .5 2 0 .8
T urkey - - 0 .8 1 1 .2 2 .2
O th ers 2 3 .6 1 7 .1 1 0 .7 1 6 .8 1 8 .0
AFRICA: 7 .0 l l .8 5 3 .1 1 0 5 .1 158.3
Kenya 3 .1 3 .8 1 5 .3 37.8 71*.9
M alawi 3 .1 6 .7 1 2 ,6 1 7 .7 3 1 .1
O th ers 0 .5 1 .3 2 5 .5 1 9 .6 5 2 .3
SOUTH AMERICA: - 0 .5 2 3 .1 3U.8
A rg e n t in a _ _ 8 .0 1 8 .7 2 7 .7
O th ers - 0 .5 1 .6 1 .1 7 .1
EUROPE: 5 .5 - 8 .1 1 1 .2 1 7 .5
USSR 5 .5 - 8 .1 1 1 .2 1 7 .5
OCEANIA: - - - 1 .5 6 .0
RE-EXPORTS: 3 3 -5 7 .1 2 0 .2 1 7 .0 53.it
UK 31 . k 6 .0 1 7 .0 21 .1 2 9 .5
N eth er la n d s 0 .1 0 .1 0 .8 21 .1 1 6 .0
O th ers 2 .0 1 .0 2 .1 1 .2 7 .9
WORLD TOTAL 1 1 2 .0 1 3 0 .6 599.1 7 26 .6 859 .1
Source: FAO, Trade Yearbook; and ITCs Annual Bulletin of Statistics.
-141-
APPENDIX TABLE XVI. TRENDS IN YIELDS OF TEA IN SELECTED 
PRODUCING COUNTRIES, 1933-35 TO 1978
( k i l o g r a m s /h e c t a r e )
1 9 3 3 -3 5 1951 1961 1971 1978
Japan 1158 1555 1668 1724 1750
Turkey - 110 4o4 1138 1585
M alawi 3 4 l 591 868 1198 1577
I n d ia 523 901 1070 1221 1548
USSR 126 342 625 909 1448
China 7Vr 837 59b 1047
Ira n - 498 500 530 1000
Kenya 393 365 712 828' 983
S r i  Lanka 446 6 4 l 869 901 888
B an g la d esh 798 838 290 825
Taiwan 210 246 379 787 762
In d o n e s ia * 435 327 ■ 540 730 716
A rg e n t in a - T4 304 802 539
S o u r c e : F A Q ,P r o d u c t io n Y ea rb ook .
I n d o n e s i a n
c r o p .
y i e l d — f i g u r e f o r  1 9 3 3 -•35 r e f e r s o n ly  t o  th e p la n t a t io n
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(th ou sa n d  m e t r ic  t o n s )
APPENDIX TABLE XVII. APPARENT ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF
TEA: 1933-35 TO 1973-75
-------------------------- - ------------------------------------
1 9 3 3 -3 5 1 9 5 5 -5 7 1 9 6 5 -6 7 1 9 7 3 -7 5
EUROPE: 2 5 4 .1 3 0 2 .5 3 5 1 .6 3 7 4 .4
UK and E ir e 2 1 1 .6 2 3 J . k 2 3 4 .7 208 .0
West Europe 22.5 36 .1 7 5 .0 1 1 7 .3
USSR 16 .0 23 .4 3 1 .7 3 3 .1
E ast E urope 4 .0 5 .6 1 0 .2 1 6 .0
ASIA (e x c lu d in g  C h in a ): 1 1 9 .9 2 73 .9 4 5 3 .4 6 3 6 .2
In d ia 4 o .o 1 0 0 .0 177 .7 260 .0
Japan 3 2 .5 5 8 . T 8 2 .7 1 1 6 .4
W est A s ia 1 5 .0 1*5 .7 6 3 .7 1 1 2 .0
P a k is ta n * - 1 7 .1 2 8 .3 4 4 .6
In d o n e s ia 8 .8 2 4 .3 4 5 .8 2 4 .0
S r i  Lanka 4 .6 8 .1 1 6 .4 2 0 .5
O th ers 1 9 .0 2 0 .0 3 8 .8 58 .7
AMERICAS: 6 3 .9 7 7 .0 1 1 4 .5
US 4 l . o 1*7.7 5 9 -7 7 7 .0
Canada 1 7 .6 2 0 .2 1 9 .6 2 1 .1
O ther s 5 .3 . 9 -1 1 4 .7 1 6 .4
AFRICA: 3 3 .6 7 0 .1 9 8 .8 1 2 7 .2
N orth  A f r i c a 1 8 .0 4 3 .4 6 4 .0 8 4 .0
U nion o f  S ou th  A f r i c a 6 .9 1 1 .9 1 7 .2 2 0 .6
E ast A f r i c a 1 .0 6 .2 8 .8 1 2 .0
O th ers 7 .7 8 .6 8 .8 1 0 .6
OCEANIA: 2 6 .9 3 2 .1 3 6 .8 34 .4
A u s t r a l ia /N e v  Z ea lan d 2 6 .9 3 2 .1 3 6 .7 34 .2
O th ers - - 0.1 0 .2
WORLD ( e x c l .  C h ina) 498 .4 755.(5 1 0 3 4 .5 1 2 8 6 .7
Source: ITC, Annual Bulletin of Statistics.
^Pakistan consumption figures for 19 5 5 -5 7  and 1 9 6 5 -6 7  include figures 
for Bangladesh.
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APi’ENDIX TABLE X V III . ‘TRENDS IN..APPARENT per  c a p it a  tea  consumption
(pounds)
1936-38 1 9 5 6 - 5 8 196 6-6 8 1976-78
TRADITIONAL CONSUMERS:
Eire 7.71* 6 .89 8.84 7.84
United Kingdom 9 .2 0 9 . 9 7 8 . 9 7 7 . 2 8
New Zealand 6.85 7 . 1 9 6.30 5.14
Australia 6 .8 5 5 . 9 6 5. 28 3.8 8
South Africa 1.5^ 1 . 8 5 1 . 8 7 1.52
Netherlands 2 .6 6 1 . 7 7 1.53 1.35
OTHER DEVELOPED:
Japan 1.04 1 . 5 6 1.95 2 . 1 8
USSR 0.23 0.46 0.63 1.19Poland 0 . 1 1 0.24 0.50 1.03
Denmark 0.3b 0.63 0.70 0 .9 6
US 0.66 0.59 0.71 0 .82
Sweden 0 . 1 6 0.35 0.47 0.80
West Germany 0 . 1 9 0.25 0.29 0.39France 0 .07 0.08 0 . 1 2 0.25Italy 0 . 0 1 0.06 0 . 1 0 0.13
WEST ASIA AND NORTH
AFRICA:
Libya 3 .5 9 5.33 8 . 1 8 8.59Iraq 1 . 9 5 4.34 5.05 i* . 79Jordan 0 .5 3 1.35 2.48 3 .2 6
Syria 0 . 1 2 0.73 1.34 2.25
Sudan 1.05 1-31 1 . 8 1 2.00
Morocco 2.64 3.28 2.00 1.69Egypt 1.01 1.66 2.00 1 . 6 2
Algeria 0.44 0.69 0.50 0.62
PRODUCERS - LDCs:
Turkey 0.13 0.47 1.23 3.87
Iran 1.15 1.58 1.96 2.33
Sri Lanka 1.85 2.31 3.22 2.14
Kenya 0.34 0.69 0.88 1.68
India 0.24 0.56 0.80 1.14
Tanzania 0.09 0.29 0.31 0.84
Indonesia 0.27 0.34 0.95 0.31
uxnnr jujus :
Chile 0.91 1.95 1.70 2.24
Pakistan 0.24 0.44 0.6l 1.66
Afghanistan . 0 .5 5 0.45 1.40 1.46
Thailand 0-13 0.15 0.11 0.03
Source: ITC, Annual Bulletin of Statistics, and FA0, ProductionYearbook.
-144-
(thousand metric tons)
APPENDIX TABLE XIX. TEA IMPORTS: 1934-38 TO 1976-78
1934-38 1950-94 1961-65 1969-71 1976-78
EUROPE: 280.8 247.3 325.4 346.5 372.0
United Kingdom 229.0 214.5 251.3 230.6 215.1
Eire 10.6 10.9 11.2 11.5 12.8
Netherlands 12.6 8.2 9 .8 31.7 24.6
Other W. Europe 10.8 10.7 20.1 25.5 39.1
USSR 1 8 . 8 1 “ 24.3 33.3 55.2Poland 1.7 y 3 .0 3.8 8.8 16.4
Other E. Europe 1.3 j - 4.9 5.1 8.8
ASIA: 33.0 44.6 71.1 135.7 207.2
Iraq 2.8 1 0 . 0 1 8 . 8 20.8 25.8
Other W. Asia 9.0 1 5 . 6 23.3 2 8 . 1 68.4
Pakistan - 0.5 0 .2 29.7 5 6 . 9
Japan - 0.4 2.5 13.8 13.9
Others 21.2 14 . 5 26.3 43.3 42.2
AFRICA: 32.0 59.5 88.0 104.4 112.7
Egypt 7-1 1 6 . 9 25.5 2 8 . 7 27.4
Other N. Africa 15.2 24.4 33.8 4l.0 50.2
South Africa 6.5 1 0 . 9 15.7 1 8 . 7 1 8 . 1
Others 3.2 7.3 13. 0 1 6 . 0 17.0
NORTH AMERICA: 56.0 6 8 . 7 78.4 91.7 1 0 6 . 0
U.S. 38.2 46.9 57.1 68.4 8 1 . 0
Canada 1 7 . 8 21.3 20.6 2 2.2 23.7
Others - 0.5 0.7 1 . 1 1.3
SOUTH AMERICA: 5.0 ..S.-3 7.4 15.3 12.9
OCEANIA: 26 .2 34.4 38.0 33.2 34.1
Australia/New
Zealand 2 6 . 1 34.1 37.7 32.7 33.6
Others 0 . 1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
TOTAL WORLD 433.0 450.8 608.3 726.8 844.9
Source: FAO, Tea Statistics and Production Yearbook.
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APPENDIX TABLE XX. UNITED KINGDOM: PEE CAPITA
CONSUMPTION OF TEA AND COFFEE
Year
COFFEE TEA
R e t a i l
P r i c e
A v erage  
P er C a p ita  
Consum ption
R e t a i l
P r i c e
A verage  
P er C a p ita  
Consum ption
(p en ce /IN .) ( I D .) ( p e n c e / l b . ) (1 8 . )
1955 1 .3 -v 9 -3
1956 y  8U.3 1 .5 y  1 7 6 .it 1 0 .1
1957 j 1 .6 J 9 .8
1958 . . . 1 .7 1 0 .0
1959 1 .9 . . . 9 .7
I9 6 0  ^ \ 2 .1 9 .3
1961 y  8 b . 1 2 .3 V  1 68 .8 9 .8
1962 I 2 -9 j 9 -5
1963 , . . 3 .1 1 6 4 .7 9 .5
1 9 6 b 89 .9 2 .7 1 63 .8 9 . ^
1965 93.8 2 .9 l 6 3 .lt 9*0
1966 95 .5 3 .1 1 62 .5 8 .8
1967 , . . 3 .3 l6 3 .i t 9 .1
1968 3 .5 8 .8
1969 b . O 8 .5
1970 k . k 8 .6
1971 ........... 4 .7 8 .2
1972 b . b 8 .0
1973 b . 9 7 .5
1971* 4 .5 7 .8
1975 ............... b . b ................... 7 .6
1976 3 .8 8 .1
1977 3 .7 7 .2
1978 . . . b . 2 6 .4
1979 * * * 5 .5 6 .6
Sottrcei D. Elz, A Review of the World TeaTOEconomy; FAQ, Tea Sta- 
ti sties; and ICO, Annual Bulletin of Statistics.
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APPENDIX TABLE XXI, UNITED STATES: TRENDS IN PER CAPITA
TEA AND COFFEE CONSUMPTION
COFFEE TEA
A v era g e  Annual P er C a p ita A v era ge  Annual P er  C a p ita
Y ear R e t a i l  P r i c e C onsum ption R e t a i l  P r i c e C onsum ption
( c e n t s / l b . ) ( I D s . ) ( c en t s / I D . ) ( I D s . )
1955 9 3 .0 1 5 .3 2 4 .2 0 .5 9
1956 1 0 3 .4 1 5 .9 2 3 .2 0 .5 9
1957 1 0 1 .7 1 5 .6 2 3 .6 0 .6 0
1958 9 0 .5 1 5 .6 2 4 .0 0 .6 0
1959 7 7 .9 1 5 .7 2 4 .2 0 .6 l
I9 6 0 7 5 .3 1 5 .7 2 4 .4 0 .6 l
1961 7 3 .6 1 5 .9 2 4 .6 0 .62
1962 7 0 .8 1 5 .9 2 4 .5 0 .6 4
1963 69 .4 1 5 .5 6 3 .6 0 .6 6
1964 8 1 .6 1 5 .3 6 3 .1 0 .6 6
1965 8 3 .3 1U.9 6 1 .4 0 .6 8
1966 8 2 .3 1 4 ,6 6 1 .2 0 .6 8
1967 77*5 1 4 .7 60 .8 0 .7 0
1968 7 6 . 4 1 4 .5 60 .6 0 .7 3
1969 7 6 .5 1 4 .3 0 .7 3
1970 9 1 .1 1 3 -8 0 .7 3
1961 ' 9 3 .4 1 3 .6 . . . 0 .7 4
1972 9 2 .7 1 3 .8 . . . 0 .7 9
1973 1 0 4 .0 1 3 .7 . » *
1971* 1 2 2 .9 1 2 .8 0 .8 0
1975 I3 3 .lt 1 2 . 4 0 .8 0
S o u r c e : D. E l z f A R ev iew  o f  the W orld  Tea Econom y; ICO, S t a t i s -
t i c a l B u l l e t i n ;  and FAO, Tea S t a t i s t i c s .
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AP.PENDIX TABLE XXII. INDIA: EXTENSIONS, REPLACEMENTS
AND REPLANTINGS OF TEA, 1951-77
Year Extensions Replacements Replantings
(in hectares)
1951-52 1,571.27 302.35 1,509.01
1952-53 1,116.83 180.00 1,189.70
1953-54 1,346.78 239.72 844.40
1954-55 2,322.41 549.85 1,418.05
1955-56 655.01 264.03 2,004.72
1956-57 954.29 480.80 2,400.46
1957-58 1,952.28 755.29 2,399.97
1958-59 2,109.32 580.08 2,434.33
1959-60 2,316.83 526.00 1,886.86
1960-61 1,713.47 352.77 1,781.87
1961-62 1,852.20 393.18 1,607.48
1962-63 2,224.88 401.13 1,571.16
1963-64 3,135.38 411.62 1,758.84
1964-65 3,860.15 551,14 2,024.26
1965-66 3,494.43 510.45 1,937,36
1966-67 3,328.88 459.83 1,628.07
1967-68 2,960.81 474.63 1,307.11
1968-69 2,635.19 373.20 1,188.68
1969-70 2,174.68 277.98 987.42
1970-71 2,355.35 201.12 1,118.96
1971-72 1,831.63 194.66 1,322.21
1972-73 1,632.98 180.36 1,109.22
1973-74 1,801.01 322.48 1,090.35
1974-75...... 1,762.29 319.83 ........ 1,220.07
1975-76 1,658.89 362.22 1,177.83
1976-77 1,769.69 366.26 1,202.76
Source:Tea Board o f I n d i a,Teastatistics1977-78,p . 7.

